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A TYPOLOGY OF AGGREGATE SETTLEMENTS
Howard M. Erichson*
INTRODUCTION
It is odd, considering how often lawyers engage in aggregate set-
tlements, that no one seems able to explain what "aggregate settle-
ment" means. It is one of the most important yet least defined terms
in complex litigation. Lawyers and judges talk about aggregate settle-
ments as though it were obvious what the term signifies and as though
it describes a single thing. In fact, group settlements in multiparty
litigation vary significantly. And they vary in ways that make it difficult
to determine whether certain deals ought to be understood as collec-
tive settlements or simply as groups of individual settlements bundled
together.
This much is clear: large-scale multiparty litigation generally set-
tles in clusters rather than one claim at a time. With or without the
judicial imprimatur of class certification-indeed, with or without for-
mal judicial aggregation of any sort-lawyers often negotiate settle-
ments of sizable portfolios of claims. Such settlements, in which
multiple plaintiffs' claims against a common defendant are resolved
together, are what lawyers variously call aggregate settlements, group
settlements, block settlements, or similar terms that emphasize the
collectiveness of the deals. What such settlements have never received
is a workable definition or a clear articulation of what makes them
meaningfully collective.
Aggregate settlements, despite their central importance as a
mechanism for resolving multiparty disputes, have received surpris-
ingly little academic and judicial attention, except to the extent they
* Professor, Seton Hall Law School. I benefited greatly from comments by
participants at the Association of American Law Schools Civil Procedure Conference,
the Brooklyn/Cardozo Mass Torts Workshop, and faculty workshops at Seton Hall
Law School and Vanderbilt Law School. I thank Allan Erbsen, Edward Hartnett,
Samuel Issacharoff, Richard Nagareda, Jon Romberg, Charles Silver, and Jay
Tidmarsh for their helpful comments on drafts. Julie von Bevern,Julie Kot, and Paul
Rosenthal provided excellent research assistance, and the Seton Hall Law School
Faculty Scholarship Fund provided financial support for this project.
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occur in the form of class actions.' Because settlements in non-class
actions need no court approval,2 they rarely generate reported deci-
sions. In addition, confidentiality agreements frequently prevent pub-
lication of settlement terms. For both of these reasons, aggregate
settlements tend to fly under the radar of most observers.
in this Article, I develop a typology of aggregate settlements. By
defining collective settlements in terms of their essential attributes, I
hope to offer a more precise way of understanding and describing
settlements in multiparty litigation and a sounder approach to apply-
ing the special ethical duties that attend aggregate settlements. Part I
explains why settlements often come in bunches, focusing on the busi-
ness imperatives that impel both plaintiffs' counsel and defendants,
for different reasons, to favor collective resolutions. Part II shows that
despite the frequency of group settlements, and the extent to which
the term "aggregate settlement" is invoked, the term is rarely defined
with clarity and never defined with adequate attention to its signifi-
cance in regulating lawyer conduct. Part III offers a definition of the
term based on a typology along two axes: allocation and conditional-
ity. By looking at the essential features of group settlements, it is pos-
sible to identify those settlements that impose on client autonomy or
create client-client or lawyer-client conflicts of interest and to distin-
guish the types of imposition and conflicts. Part IV uses the typology
to delineate a sound application of the aggregate settlement rule, a
rule of professional conduct that prohibits aggregate settlements in
1 Laws. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 51:376 (Feb. 3, 1999) ("The rela-
tively small number of reported cases on the subject of aggregate settlements belies
the growing importance of such settlements as a means of resolving large cases.");
Roger C. Cramton, Lawyer Ethics on the Lunar Landscape of Asbestos Litigation, 31 PEPP.
L. REV. 175, 193 (2003) ("The [aggregate settlement] rule has received very little
attention in the courts or academic literature."). Articles that address aggregate set-
tlements outside of class actions include Lester Brickman, Lauyers'Ethics and Fiduciary
Obligation in the Brave New World of Aggregative Litigation, 26 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. &
POL'v REv. 243 (2001); Cramton, supra, at 193-96; Howard M. Erichson, Beyond the
Class Action: Lawyer Loyalty and Client Autonomy in Non-Class Collective Representation,
2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 519, 569-75; Nancy J. Moore, The Case Against Changing the
Aggregate Settlement Rule in Mass Tort Lawsuits, 41 S. TEX. L. REV. 149 (1999); Paul D.
Rheingold, Ethical Constraints on Aggregated Settlements of Mass Tort Cases, 31 Loy. L.A.
L. REv. 395 (1998); Charles Silver & Lynn Baker, I Cut, You Choose: The Role of Plain-
tiffs' Counsel in Allocating Settlement Proceeds, 84 VA. L. REv. 1465 (1998) [hereinafter
Silver & Baker, I Cut, You Choose]; Charles Silver & Lynn Baker, Mass Lawsuits and the
Aggregate Settlement Rule, 32 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 733 (1997) [hereinafter Silver &
Baker, Aggregate Settlement Rule].
2 Exceptions include consent judgments and settlements involving minors.
Shareholder derivative suits require court approval of settlements. See FED. R. Crv. P.
23.1. For these purposes they may be understood as a species of class action.
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the absence of disclosure and informed consent. Finally, although the
typology primarily addresses multiparty settlements in non-class litiga-
tion, Part V explores how some of the same ideas might be applied to
improve understanding of the structures of class action settlements.
I. WHY SETTLEMENTS COME IN BUNCHES
Before turning to the typology, it is worth asking why parties so
often settle in bunches.3 Much litigation involves similar claims of
large numbers of plaintiffs against a common set of defendants.
Claims with common issues against common defendants create incen-
tives for both plaintiffs and defendants to seek aggregate resolutions.
In some areas of mass litigation, such as securities and antitrust, class
actions provide a viable mechanism for litigation and settlement.
Such settlements often occur in class action form, which can be un-
derstood as a particular species of aggregate settlement.4 Other types
of cases, particularly mass torts, more often settle in non-class
bunches. It is worth asking why, in the absence of class certification,
such claims tend to settle in bunches rather than individually. The
answer lies in the convergence of several realities of mass litigation
practice: the difficulty of class certification, the collective business of
mass plaintiffs' law practice, and the preference of defendants for in-
clusive resolutions.5 In addition, judges struggling with mass litigation
often encourage group settlements to resolve large numbers of
claims. 6
3 I borrow the phrase "settle in bunches" from the title of Eric Green's article,
What Will We Do When Adjudication Ends? We'll Settle in Bunches: Bringing Rule 23 into the
Twenty-First Century, 44 UCLA L. REv. 1773 (1997); see also Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., The
Settlement Black Box, 75 B.U. L. REV. 1257, 1258-59 (1995) ("[S]ome argue that per-
sonal injury cases cannot be settled justly, or at least settled justly by the bunch.").
The Green and Hazard articles concern settlement class actions, but "settle in
bunches" may even more aptly describe non-class collective settlements.
4 For a discussion of class settlements as aggregate settlements, see Part V, infra.
5 Samuel Issacharoff and John Witt make the interesting observation that forms
of aggregate settlements have been a feature of tort resolutions for more than a cen-
tury. They show that in non-mass torts such as auto accidents and workplace injuries,
insurance adjusters and other repeat players have long treated resolutions on an ag-
gregate basis. See Samuel Issacharoff & John Fabian Witt, The Inevitability of Aggregate
Settlement: An Institutional Account of American Tort Law, 57 VAND. L. REv. 1571, 1605
(2004).
6 Judge Charles Weiner, the Multidistrict Litigation judge for all federal court
asbestos cases, has overseen the resolution of over 75,000 cases. "Group settlements
were and are critical to the movement of these cases," he stated. In rejoint E. & S.
Dists. Asbestos Litig., 237 F. Supp. 2d 297, 306 (E.D.N.Y., S.D.N.Y. & Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
2002) (quoting Letter from Judge Charles R. Weiner (Oct. 15, 2002)).
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Unlike in some areas of mass litigation where class actions have
proved a viable mechanism for litigation and settlement, class certifi-
cation is denied in most personal injury mass tort cases. 7 Personal
injury claims, most courts find, involve too many individual issues to
justify class treatment. In the late 1990s, the Supreme Court's rejec-
tion of two asbestos settlement class actions in Amchem Products, Inc. v.
Windsor and Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp.9 drove home the difficulty of ob-
taining class certification for personal injury mass torts, especially for
those seeking global resolutions through settlement class actions. Ju-
dicial skepticism about mass tort class actions, however, long predates
the Supreme Court's decisions in Amchem and Ortiz. The 1966 Advi-
sory Committee's note to the Rule 23 amendments cautioned against
class treatment for "mass accident" cases,1 0 and courts for the next
twenty years routinely cited that note in rejecting class certification for
mass torts. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, several cases seemed to
indicate an upward trend in mass tort class actions,1 1 but a string of
7 See, e.g., Wethington v. Purdue Pharma LP, 218 F.R.D. 577, 590 (S.D. Ohio
2003) (denying class certification in a case involving the drug OxyContin); Perez v.
Metabolife Int'l, Inc., 218 F.R.D. 262, 276 (S.D. Fla. 2003) (denying class certification
in a case involving an ephedra-containing dietary supplement); In re Baycol Prods.
Litig., 218 F.R.D. 197, 216 (D. Minn. 2003) (denying class certification in the multidis-
trict litigation transferee court in a case involving the cholesterol drug Baycol); Mason
v. Am. Tobacco Co., 212 F. Supp. 2d 88, 94 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (denying class certifica-
tion in a tobacco case brought by Medicare recipients), afrd, 346 F.3d 36 (2d Cir.
2003). While personal injury class actions are rarely certified, medical monitoring
class certification has proved less difficult. See, e.g., Lewis v. Bayer AG, No. 2353, 2004
WL 1146692, at *1 (Pa. Ct. Comm. P1. Nov. 18, 2004) (denying class certification in
the Baycol mass tort litigation for personal injury claims, but granting certification of
a medical monitoring class); Scott v. Am. Tobacco Co., 1998-0452 (La. App. 4 Cir. 11/
4/98), 725 So. 2d (certifying a tobacco medical monitoring class action).
8 521 U.S. 591 (1997).
9 527 U.S. 815 (1999).
10 FED. R. Civ. P. 23 advisory committee's note (1966 amend.). The note empha-
sized the difficulty of meeting the predominance and superiority requirements of
Rule 23(b) (3) for personal injury claims:
A "mass accident" resulting in injuries to numerous persons is ordinarily not
appropriate for a class action because of the likelihood that significant ques-
tions, not only of damages but of liability and defenses of liability, would be
present, affecting the individuals in different ways. In these circumstances,
an action conducted nominally as a class action would degenerate in prac-
tice into multiple lawsuits separately tried.
Id.
11 See Watson v. Shell Oil Co., 979 F.2d 1014, 1021 (5th Cir. 1992) (upholding
class certification in an oil refinery explosion case); In re A.H. Robins Co., 880 F.2d
709, 710 (4th Cir. 1989) (upholding class certification in a Dalkon Shield case);Jen-
kins v. Raymark Indus., 782 F.2d 468, 475 (5th Cir. 1986) (upholding class certifica-
[VOL. 8o:51772
A TYPOLOGY OF AGGREGATE SETTLEMENTS
appellate reversals in the mid-1990s' 2 squelched that development
and set the stage for Amchem and Ortiz. In recent years, lawyers have
turned increasingly to state courts, where class certification motions
have received a somewhat more hospitable reception,' 3 but even
there, mass tort class actions often are rejected.1 4
Because of the difficulty obtaining class certification for mass
torts, the cases proceed and settle largely on a non-class basis. How-
ever, even without representative litigation in the form of a class ac-
tion, mass tort litigation, like other types of mass litigation, rarely goes
forward on a truly individual basis. Much of the litigation is aggre-
gated through formal non-class mechanisms such as federal multidis-
trict litigation 15 and state court consolidation. 16 Other litigation is
informally aggregated by the coordinated work of the lawyers.17 Most
important for purposes of this Article, the accumulation of large num-
bers of clients by plaintiffs' firms functions as an informal aggregation
mechanism, facilitating the negotiation of group settlements.
A. The Collective Nature of Mass Plaintiffs' Law Practice
Notwithstanding the refusal of courts to certify class actions, mass
litigation claims proceed on a collective basis. In situations involving
tion in an asbestos case); see also Paul D. Rheingold, Tort Class Actions: What They Can
and Cannot Achieve, TRIAL, Feb. 1990, at 59, 63 ("[T]he trend in the courts seems
toward the use of mandatory classes in tort actions as a means of disposing of mass
litigation areas that threaten to clog the courts.").
12 See Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 752 (5th Cir. 1996) (decertifying
a class in a tobacco action); In reAm. Med. Sys., Inc., 75 F.3d 1069, 1089 (6th Cir.
1996) (decertifying a class in a penile implants action); In re Gen. Motors Corp. Pick-
Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768, 779 (3d Cir. 1995) (decertifying
a class in an action regarding motor vehicles); In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51
F.3d 1293, 1304 (7th Cir. 1995) (decertifying a class in an action regarding HIV-
tainted blood).
13 Mark C. Weber, Forum Allocation in Toxic Tort Cases: Lessons from the Tobacco
Litigation and Other Recent Developments, 26 WM. & MARY ENvTL. L. & POL'Y REv. 93,
96-97 (2001).
14 See, e.g., Liggett Group, Inc. v. Engle, 853 So. 2d 434 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003)
(decertifying a tobacco class action), appeal granted, 873 So. 2d 1222 (Fla. 2004); Lewis
v. Bayer AG, No. 2353, 2004 WL 1146692, at *1 (Pa. Ct. Comm. Pl. Nov. 9, 2004)
(denying class certification for personal injury claims involving the drug Baycol).
15 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2000).
16 See, e.g., CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE §§ 404.1-.8 (West 2004); NJ. CT. R. 4:38. On
the formal aggregation of mass tort litigation in state courts, see Paul D. Rheingold,
Prospects for Managing Mass Tort Litigation in the State Courts, 31 SETON HALL L. REv.
910, 911-13 (2001).
17 See generally Howard M. Erichson, Informal Aggregation: Procedural and Ethical
Implications of Coordination Among Counsel in Related Lawsuits, 50 DuKE L.J. 381 (2000).
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widely held claims stemming from the purchase or use of mass-mar-
keted products or services, plaintiffs' law firms often represent dozens,
hundreds, or thousands of individual clients with similar claims. This
results from well-established advertising and referral networks along
with firms' specialization in particular mass torts. 18 In some cases, un-
ions, homeowners' associations, and other groups facilitate collective
representation.
The business of mass litigation dictates a collective approach. To
justify the investment required to litigate mass torts and other com-
plex litigation effectively, plaintiffs' lawyers seek to represent large
numbers of clients to reduce the per-plaintiff cost of litigating and to
maximize returns on sunk costs. By taking advantage of economies of
scale, mass litigators can pursue claims on behalf of large numbers of
plaintiffs, some of whose claims otherwise would have negative value.
The amplified stakes of collective representation permit plaintiffs' law-
yers to invest in the litigation at a much higher level than individual
representation would justify.19
Thus, non-class mass litigation often resembles class actions in
the sense that numerous plaintiffs depend on counsel with whom they
have no meaningful individual relationship and whose loyalty is di-
rected primarily to collective interests.20 Each client's claim consti-
tutes only a small fraction of the economic value of the group.
Indeed, one irony of Amchem and Ortiz is that the Supreme Court was
so protective of the interests of mass tort plaintiffs, so concerned that
absent class members would not be treated fairly, that as a practical
matter it sent most mass tort plaintiffs into non-class collective repre-
sentation where they are treated much like absent class members but
without the safeguards of class action procedure.
The collective nature of mass plaintiffs' law practice not only
leads plaintiffs' counsel to litigate on an aggregate basis, but also leads
18 See Erichson, supra note 1, at 532-39. For an account of the various forms of
collective representation outside of class actions, including mass representation by a
single firm, see id. at 530-43.
19 David Rosenberg advances a forceful version of the argument that aggregation
is needed in order to allow plaintiffs' counsel to make optimal investment in the liti-
gation. David Rosenberg, Adding a Second Opt-Out to Rule 23(b)(3) Class Actions: Cost
Without Benefit, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 19, 27-30. Elsewhere, I have argued that Rosen-
berg takes his point too far in concluding that mandatory class actions are needed for
mass torts. See Erichson, supra note 1, at 550 n.117. We agree, however, on the start-
ing point-that by litigating collectively, plaintiffs' attorneys invest in the litigation
based on aggregate stakes and thus obtain a more level field with defendants.
20 I explore this connection at length in Beyond the Class Action: Lawyer Loyalty and
Client Autonomy in Non-Class Collective Representation, supra note 1.
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them to settle on an aggregate basis.21 The portfolio of a lawyer with a
sizable inventory of mass tort clients ordinarily includes claims of vary-
ing strength. In addition to those with serious present injuries, the
portfolio may include a much larger number of clients with weaker
claims. These may include exposure-only claimants, as well as plain-
tiffs with evidentiary weaknesses such as exposure or causation
problems, or procedural weaknesses such as statute of limitations ob-
stacles. The plaintiffs' lawyer is apt to be more enthusiastic about set-
fling the serious claims if the defendant is willing to offer something
for the other clients as well.2 2
B. Defendants' Preference for Inclusive Resolutions
If the business of mass plaintiffs' law practice explains why plain-
tiffs' attorneys litigate and pursue settlements on a collective basis,
what explains why a defendant would agree to a large package of set-
tlements? Defendants, of course, prefer no liability at all. But when
liability is likely, or even plausible, risk-averse corporate defendants
often favor settlement. This is particularly true in litigation in which a
series of related cases establishes a high likelihood of liability. In mass
torts, the notion of "maturity" captures the idea that at some point,
the liability arguments may be well established, outcomes may be rela-
tively predictable, and claims values may be stable and reasonably well
understood by lawyers on both sides. 23 What remains unknown in
some mature mass torts, however, is the strength and length of the
stream of future claims, especially if the alleged harm involves a la-
tency period.24 As mass tort litigation matures, the certainty of liabil-
21 See Fred Misko, Jr., A Professional Responsibility Checklist for the Class Action
and Mass Tort Practitioner (Feb. 6, 1998) (unpublished manuscript) ("The mass tort
bar prefers aggregate settlements."), available at http://www.misko.com/library/
Ethics.pdf.
22 Judge Jack Weinstein has observed that "[o]ften the pressure for block settle-
ments comes from plaintiffs' attorneys who hope to get something for a large mass of
questionable cases." JACK B. WEINSTEIN, INDIVIDUAL JUSTICE IN MASS TORT LITIGATION
74 (1995). In asbestos cases and other mass torts, group settlements have become a
standard way of doing business. One judge, describing a case as a "fairly typical" as-
bestos personal injury action, noted that it involved "commencement of the lawsuit
against multiple defendants, intervening bankruptcies of some, and settlement with a
few, oftentimes as part of group settlements." In re Seventh Judicial Dist. Asbestos
Litig., 764 N.Y.S.2d 168, 174 (Sup. Ct. 2003).
23 See Francis E. McGovern, Resolving Mature Mass Tort Litigation, 69 B.U. L. REV.
659 (1989).
24 Francis McGovern calls this the "elasticity" of the mass tort. See Francis E. Mc-
Govern, An Analysis of Mass Torts for Judges, 73 TEX. L. REv. 1821, 1827-34 (1995).
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ity, combined with the uncertain extent of that liability, imposes
pressure on defendants to resolve the litigation with finality.
A defendant's search for a broadly inclusive resolution reflects a
desire to put the dispute in the past and get on with business. It is
driven, in part, by the financial markets' demand that businesses con-
tain the liability risk. The broader the resolution, the easier it is for a
defendant to quantify the remaining risk. Defense lawyer Andrew
Berry describes the pressure on defendants:
[A] mass tort defendant which accurately assesses its future liabili-
ties by using an aggregated legal proceeding to "capture" a largenumber of claimants makes Wall Street happy. Certainty has valuein the capital markets' analysis of a company; apparent certainty is
almost as good. A company which plausibly consigns mass tort lia-bilities to the past by, for example, settling a comprehensive classaction or announcing a "global settlement" (no matter how expen-sive) may be rewarded by an increase in its market capitalization. 25
As Berry explains, a settlement that binds many claimants permits a
defendant "to take its hit, declare victory, and move on."26
A defendant might consider several avenues for resolving mass
liability on a global basis. The first is the settlement class action, but
that is precisely the tool that Amchem and Ortiz render nearly unusable
for global resolutions of personal injury mass torts. Settlement class
actions raise substantial concerns of collusion, reverse auction, and
insufficient leverage. 27 These problems affect the adequacy of repre-
sentation, which is required for all class actions, 28 as well as the fair-
25 Andrew T. Berry, Comments on Aggregation: Some Unintended Consequences of Ag-gregative Disposition Procedures, 31 SETON HALL L. REV. 920, 921 (2001).
26 Id. at 921-22; see also Alex Raskolnikov, Note, Is There a Future for Future Claim-ants After Amchein Products, Inc. v. Windsor ?, 107 YALE L.J. 2545 (1998). Raskolnikov
argues in favor of a regime of mandatory class settlements of future claims, in partbecause with mandatory global settlements "the market will include this information
in defendants' stock prices, which will therefore be higher than under conditions ofuncertainty. Thus, the proposed regime will produce a net surplus in the value of
defendant firms." Id. at 2572.
27 While the Amchem case made its way through the lower courts, these concernsabout settlement class actions were voiced by a number of commentators. SeeJohn C.Coffee, Jr., Class Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass Tort Class Action, 95 COLUM. L. REV.
1343 (1995); Susan P. Koniak, Feasting While the Widow Weeps, Georgine v. AmchemProds., Inc., 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1045 (1995); Brian Wolfman & Alan B. Morrison,
Representing the Unrepresented in Class Actions Seeking Monetary Relief 71 N.Y.U. L. REX,.
439 (1996).
28 See FED. R. CIv. P. 23(a) (4); Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 625
(1997); Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 43 (1940).
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ness of the settlement, which needs the court's approval. 29 Thus,
while settlement class actions retain some viability, Amchem and Ortiz
taught courts to be view them with a skeptical eye.
30
Although some settlement class actions remain viable after
Amchem and Ortiz, those two decisions make it particularly difficult to
achieve the broadly inclusive resolutions craved by defendants facing
severe mass tort liability. Specifically, they make it hard to obtain na-
tionwide resolution, future claims resolution, or mandatory resolu-
tion. First, if a defendant hopes to resolve common law liability on a
nationwide basis, Amchem makes it difficult to do so because it empha-
sizes the choice-of-law problem presented by nationwide state law class
actions.3 1 Differences in applicable state law-which federal courts
are bound to apply under the Erie doctrine and the Rules of Decision
Act 2-interfere with several class action requirements, including pre-
dominance, 33 superiority,34 and adequacy of representation. 35 Sec-
ond, if a defendant wishes to stem its liability by resolving future
claims, Amchem and Ortiz discourage such resolutions by emphasizing
the multitude of problems connected to future claims resolution, in-
cluding the conflict of interest between present and future claim-
ants. 36 Third, whereas pre-Ortiz defendants may have viewed Rule
23(b) (1) (B) limited fund settlement class actions as a way to achieve
mandatory global resolution of mass liability, Ortiz eliminates
29 See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e); Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 849 (1999);
Amchem, 521 U.S. at 617.
30 See Howard M. Erichson, Mass Tort Litigation and Inquisitorial Justice, 87 GEo.
L.J. 1983, 1995-2005 (1999).
31 See Amchem, 521 U.S. at 610 n.14; see also Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d
734 (5th Cir. 1996) (decertifying a nationwide tobacco class action in part based on
choice-of-law concerns); In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293 (7th Cir.
1995) (decertifying a nationwide blood products class action in part based on choice-
of-law concerns and decrying the "Esperanto jury instruction"). But see In re Simon II
Litig., 211 F.R.D. 86 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (Weinstein, J.) (certifying a nationwide
mandatory punitive damages class in the tobacco litigation, based in part upon a
choice-of-law analysis concluding that New York law would govern all claims). See
generally Larry Kramer, Choice of Law in Complex Litigation, 71 N.Y.U. L. REv. 547 (1996)
(discussing various ways to handle the choice-of-law problem in mass tort class
actions).
32 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2000).
33 See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b) (3) (requiring, for Rule 23(b) (3) class certification,
that common issues predominate over individual ones).
34 See id. (requiring, for Rule 23(b) (3) class certification, that class action be the
superior method for resolving the claims).
35 See FED. R. Crv. P. 23(a) (4); see also Amchem, 521 U.S. at 625-26.
36 See Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 853 (1999); Amchem, 521 U.S. at
17772005]
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whatever appeal that route may have had. Not only does Ortiz make itextremely difficult to meet the requirements for limited fund class
certification,3 7 but it also requires that essentially all of the defen-dant's assets be included in the settlement,38 thus removing any incen-tive for defendants to use limited fund settlements as a reorganization
device.3 9
A second avenue that defendants may consider for global resolu-
tions of liability is bankruptcy.40 Chapter 11 bankruptcy has becomethe method of choice or necessity for many defendants facing massiveliability.4' For some defendants, however, it is unavailable because
they do not satisfy the requirements of the Bankruptcy Code. 42 In anyevent, bankruptcy would hardly be most defendants' first choice as amechanism for resolving liability. While bankruptcy offers usefulmechanisms for gathering claims and for accomplishing a broadly in-clusive resolution, and prepackaged bankruptcies increasingly are
used as a means of resolving liability,43 bankruptcy may be unappeal-
ing to defendants because of a number of direct and indirect costs. 44
37 See Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 842.
38 See id. at 849.
39 The opinion leaves open a small possibility for defendants to survive a limitedfund class action. Savings in transaction costs may provide a basis for the defendantto put less than one hundred percent of its assets into the settlement. See id. at860-61. Only in the direst cases, however, does it seem plausible that a defendant
would find this an appealing basis on which to resolve liability.
40 Even in bankruptcy, however, defendants face the need to resolve claims bymeans of aggregate settlement or otherwise. SeeJoseph F. Rice & Nancy Worth Davis,
The Future of Mass Tort Claims: Comparison of Settlement Class Action to Bankruptcy Treat-ment of Mass Tort Claims, 50 S.C. L. REv. 405, 428-35 (1999) (expressing skepticism
about the ability of bankruptcy to resolve future claims). See generally Michael F. Per-liss & Philip E. Atkins-Pattenson, Complex Litigation in the Context of the Bankruptcy Laws,
in COMPLEX LITIGATION IN THE CONTEXT OF THE BANKgui-rcy LAWS (PLI Litig. Course,Handbook Series No. 254, 1984) (discussing settlement considerations from the de-fendant's perspective in the context of Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings).
41 See, e.g., A.H. Robins Co. v. Piccinin, 788 F.2d 994 (4th Cir. 1986) (A.H. Robinsbankruptcy due to Dalkon Shield litigation); In rejoint E. & S. Dists. Asbestos Litig.,129 B.R. 710 (E.D.N.Y. & Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1991) Uohns-Manville bankruptcy due toasbestos litigation); In re Dow Coming Corp., No. 95-20512, 1995 Bankr. LEXIS 1123(Bankr. E.D. Mich. Aug. 9, 1995) (Dow Coming bankruptcy due to breast implant
litigation).
42 See 11 U.S.C. § 101(32) (2000) (defining insolvency for purposes of a bank-
ruptcy petition).
43 See Roger Parloff, Welcome to the New Asbestos Scanda4 FORTUNE, Sept. 6, 2004, at186, 186 (discussing the rise of prepackaged asbestos bankruptcies).
44 Stephen J. Lubben, The Direct Costs of Corporate Reorganization: An Empirical Ex-amination of Professional Fees in Large Chapter 11 Cases, 74 Am. BANKR. L.J. 509, 511-12
(2000).
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Another route to global resolution is legislation, but that route
has proved difficult and dangerous for most defendants. Although
the airline industry achieved a stunning victory with the enactment of
the September 11 Victim Compensation Fund,45 the circumstances
surrounding that legislation were exceptional. Most mass tort defend-
ants have been unable to stem liability by statute. The asbestos indus-
try has yet to achieve a legislative solution to its liability woes, despite
years of lobbying and some bipartisan support.46 The tobacco indus-
try initially supported a massive legislative settlement of tobacco liabil-
ity in 1997, only to lose control of the process and ultimately withdraw
its support for the bill as the legislative proposal became increasingly
unfavorable to the industry.47 More recently, the gun industry failed
in its attempt to avoid liability through federal legislation.
48
45 Less than two weeks after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, Congress
passed the Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act "lt] o preserve the
continued viability of the United States air transportation system." Pub. L. No. 107-
42, 115 Stat. 230, 230 (2001). The government provided the airlines fifteen billion
dollars in cash and loan guarantees, limited the airlines' liability to the amount of
their insurance coverage, and established a fund to pay compensation to victims on
the condition that the victims agree not to sue the airlines.
Congress created the compensation fund in the days after the terrorist attack
not as solace for the families .... Rather, Congress sought to protect the
airlines from lawsuits. The major airlines faced billions of dollars in poten-
tial claims, and legislators worried that the industry might come to a halt, if
not collapse altogether.
Michael Powell & Michelle Garcia, Eleventh Hour Approaches to Apply for 9/11 Fund,
WASH. POST, Dec. 22, 2003, at A2. "Congress, acting at the behest of powerful lobby-
ists, granted some immunity to some of the most likely defendants." James Grimaldi,
After a Respectful Pause, Lawyers Line Up to Sue, WASH. POST, Sept. 9, 2002, at El.
46 As of this writing, the Fairness in Asbestos Injury Resolution Act, S. 1125, 108th
Cong. (2003), which was voted out of the Senate Judiciary Committee in July 2003,
remains in limbo, and representatives of asbestos defendants, insurers, organized la-
bor, and plaintiffs' lawyers continue to struggle to reach a consensus on the total
amount of funds required and other issues. See 150 CONG. REc. S2987-01 (daily ed.
Mar. 23, 2004) (addressing the current status of the bill and continuing efforts to
achieve consensus among the interested parties). The asbestos defendants' current
effort to obtain finality through legislation began in the aftermath of the Supreme
Court's Amchem decision. Unable to resolve their liability by settlement class action,
six asbestos defendants hired a lobbying firm to explore the possibility of federal legis-
lation. Asbestos Defendants Hire Lobby Firm to Seek Settlement, MEALEY'S LITIG. REP.: ASBES-
TOS, Feb. 6, 1998, at 18. In May 1998, Representative Henry Hyde introduced a bill
entitled the "Fairness in Asbestos Compensation Act of 1998." H.R. 3905, 105th
Cong.
47 Erichson, supra note 30, at 2020-22.
48 Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act, S. 659, 108th Cong. (2003). Sen-
ator Diane Feinstein described the bill as "'essentially giv[ing] the gun industry blan-
ket immunity from civil liability cases-an immunity that no other industry has.'"
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Given the difficulty of obtaining a global resolution by settlement
class action or otherwise, the mass litigation defendant naturally turns
to the next best thing-approaching each plaintiffs' firm about set-
fling its portfolio of cases en masse. By settling large blocks of cases, a
defendant can make strides toward reducing its liability exposure to amanageable, quantifiable level. 4 9 Moreover, by settling the leading
plaintiff firms' entire inventories of cases, a defendant can try to rid
itself of the most threatening lawyers on the plaintiffs' side.5 0
Claims for injunctive remedies, such as public interest litigation
seeking institutional reforms, also may settle on an aggregate basis.
Although defendants often resist class certification in such cases, they
may settle with a number of plaintiffs on the basis of an agreement to
institute structural reforms.
In the mass tort context, one plaintiffs' lawyer puts it this way:
In the high-stakes game of mass tort litigation, defense and plain-
tiffs' counsel can usually agree on one thing-the best resolution of
a case often comes not by way of an expensive and risky trial, butrather through a negotiated settlement. Increasingly, mass tort law-
yers have come to rely on the aggregate or "global" settlement in
resolving the claims of plaintiffs that typically number in the hun-
dreds or thousands. 5 1
From both the plaintiffs' and defendants' perspective, it makes sense
that settlements come in bunches.
II. "AGGREGATE SETTLEMENT" AS AN UNDEFINED TERv
Given the frequency with which mass litigation settles in groups,
it is important to understand the nature of such settlements and to
define which ones are meaningfully collective. Outside of class ac-
Richard Simon & Mary Curtius, Gun-Shy Democrats Are Giving the NRA Room to Maneu-
ver, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 26, 2004, at A18. The bill passed the House of Representatives in
April 2003 but failed to pass the Senate.
49 Francis McGovern describes "settl[ing] with key plaintiffs' counsel" as part of
the overall containment strategy of mass tort defendants. McGovern, supra note 24, at
1835.
50 It is unethical to offer or make "an agreement in which a restriction on thelawyer's right to practice is part of the settlement of a client controversy." MODEL
RuLEs OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.6(b) (2002). Thus, plaintiffs' lawyers are prohibitedfrom entering a settlement in which they agree not to represent additional plaintiffswith similar claims, and defendants may not ask them to do so. Such offers and agree-ments do occur in mass tort cases, however. Even without including an explicit re-striction on practice in the settlement agreement, defendants likely expect that acertain number of plaintiffs' firms will move on to other matters once they have set-tled their entire inventory of cases against a particular defendant.
51 Misko, supra note 21, at 4.
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tions, one can imagine thinking of a multiparty settlement as nothing
more than a number of individual settlements that happen to be ne-
gotiated at the same time. What makes a bundle of settlements"aggregate"?
It matters how we define aggregate settlements because, under
prevailing legal ethics doctrine, client protection depends on how a
settlement is characterized. Every state has a version of the aggregate
settlement rule. Under that rule, a lawyer may not make an "aggre-
gate settlement" unless the lawyer obtains each client's informed con-
sent after disclosing the full scope of the deal.
52
Most of the states' aggregate settlement rules are versions of
Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.8(g):
A lawyer who represents two or more clients shall not participate in
making an aggregate settlement of the claims of or against the cli-
ents, or in a criminal case an aggregated agreement as to guilty or
nolo contendere pleas, unless each client gives informed consent,
in a writing signed by the client. The lawyer's disclosure shall in-
clude the existence and nature of all the claims or pleas involved
and of the participation of each person in the settlement.
53
The Model Code of Professional Responsibility includes a largely iden-
tical provision in Disciplinary Rule 5-106.54 California's variation con-
tains similar restrictions: "A member who represents two or more
clients shall not enter into an aggregate settlement of the claims or
against the clients without the informed written consent of each
client."55
52 Because the rule employs the language "aggregate settlement," it is more use-
ful to define that term than to define various others, such as "block settlement" or"group settlement," that are used interchangeably and with equal imprecision.
53 MODEL RuLEs OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.8(g) (2002).
54 The Code provision, under the heading "Settling Similar Claims of Clients,"
states:
A lawyer who represents two or more clients shall not make or participate in
the making of an aggregate settlement of the claims of or against his clients,
unless each client has consented to the settlement after being advised of the
existence and nature of all the claims involved in the proposed settlement,
of the total amount of the settlement, and of the participation of each per-
son in the settlement.
MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-106(A) (1980).
55 CAL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3-310(D) (1996). The rule defines "in-
formed written consent" as "the client's or former client's written agreement to the
representation following written disclosure." CAL. RuLEs OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3-
310(A) (2). "Disclosure," in turn, "means informing the client or former client of the
relevant circumstances and of the actual and reasonably foreseeable adverse conse-
quences to the client or former client." CAL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3-310
(A) (1).
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Every version of the rule leaves "aggregate settlement" undefined.The rule prohibits aggregate settlements in the absence of certain dis-
closures and client consent, but it never states what constitutes an ag-
gregate settlement. The comment to the Model Rule explains that
"before any settlement offer or plea bargain is made or accepted on
behalf of multiple clients," the lawyer must obtain informed consent,
but the comment adds nothing useful to the definition of aggregate
settlement; it merely restates it as a settlement "on behalf of multiple
clients." 56 The Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers incorpo-rates the aggregate settlement rule in a comment to its provision on
concurrent client-client conflicts, but like the Model Rule comment,
the Restatement simply refers to settlement "on behalf of multiple cli-
ents" without further definition. 57
This definitional void has not gone unnoticed by those who at-
tempt to understand when the rule applies. In the ABA/BNA Lawyers'
Manual on Professional Conduct, an oft-consulted authority on the law
governing lawyers, the promising heading "What Is an Aggregate Set-
tlement?" is followed by the disappointing news that "[n] either ModelRule 1.8(g) nor the Model Code's DR 5-106(A) defines the term 'ag-
gregate settlement.' "58 The Manual adds unhelpfully that "[c]ourts
tend to use the term 'aggregate settlement' interchangeably withphrases that emphasize the group or collective nature of the agree-
ment."59 A Texas lawyer who developed an ethics checklist for mass
tort practitioners listed several unanswered questions, including "what
exactly is an 'aggregate settlement' as defined by the rule?"60 Henoted that "Texas law does not define 'aggregate settlement' and the
Texas Supreme Court's Professional Ethics Committee has issued no
opinions defining the term."61
Most authorities fail to define the term with any precision, but
some of them do contain statements to the effect that an aggregate
settlement is one in which a defendant pays a sum to settle an entire
group of claims. An Oregon ethics opinion on conflicts of interest in
56 MODEL RuLEs OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.8 cmt. 13.
57 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAwYERs § 128 cmt. d(i)(2002) ("Before any settlement is accepted on behalf of multiple clients, their lawyermust inform each of them about all of the terms of the settlement, including theamounts that each of the other claimants will receive if the settlement is accepted.").
58 Laws. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 51:377 (June 24, 1998).
59 Id. (citing cases using the term interchangeably with "package deal" and "grosssettlement"); see also Silver & Baker, Aggregate Settlement Rule, supra note 1, at 737 (not-ing the rule's failure to define "aggregate settlement").
60 Misko, supra note 21, at 6.
61 Id.
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auto accident cases, for example, states: "For purposes of this opinion,
the term aggregate settlement means an all-or-nothing total settlement of
a single sum of money for all claims pending for a group of plain-
tiffs." 62 One lawyer warns that " [p] roposed 'bulk' or 'aggregate' type
of settlements, wherein the defending interests proposed one lump
sum of money to be somehow allocated among multiple claims on the
other side present very special ethical and practical problems. 63 An-
other lawyer's description of aggregate settlements runs as follows:
"Aggregate settlements arise when defendants offer a lump sum settle-
ment to a group ofjointly represented plaintiffs and require, as a con-
dition of final resolution, that all plaintiffs participate in the
settlement."64 The Lawyers' Manual practice guide on the aggregate
settlement rule states "[1] awyers frequently seek an all-or-nothing set-
tlement in an effort to resolve the case once and for all," implying that
this describes the settlements to which the rule applies. 65 These au-
thorities and others66 describe aggregate settlements as deals in which
an entire block of claims is settled by a single payment by the
defendant.
They describe, in other words, a lump sum package deal. Such
deals, while the most obvious type of aggregate settlement, are not the
62 Or. State Bar Legal Ethics Comm., Formal Op. 2000-158, at n.1 (2000); see also
S.C. Bar Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 95-02 (1995).
If a lump sum of money is offered in exchange for release of all claims, the
lawyer may be involved in a conflict if the parties do not agree as to how the
settlement should be divided. Obviously, the lawyer would then be required
to comply with the requirements of Rule 1.8(g) if an aggregate settlement is
contemplated.
Id.
63 Gerald C. Stems, Considerations Relating to Representing Multiple Plaintiffs Involved
in the Same Accident: "Adverse Interests" and "Potential and Actual" Conflicts, in 2 ATLA
ANNUAL CONVENTION REFERENCE MATERIALS 1681, 1690 (2003).
64 Misko, supra note 21, at 4 (citing James M. McCormack, Conflicts of Interest in
Complex Litigation, in STATE BAR OF TEXAS CONFERENCE ON RECOGNIZING AND RESOLV-
ING CONFLICTS OF INTEREST, at G-3 (1997)).
65 Laws. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 51:375 (Feb. 3, 1999). But cf. id. at
51:379 (acknowledging that aggregate settlements may contain individual amounts
for each plaintiff).
66 See, e.g., Arce v. Burrow, 958 S.W.2d 239, 245 (Tex. App. 1997), affid, 997
S.W.2d 229 (Tex. 1999); Brickman, supra note 1, at 270 ("In an aggregate settlement,
the defendant provides a lump sum of money for distribution to the claimants in the
sole discretion of plaintiffs' counsel."); Jack B. Weinstein, Ethical Dilemmas in Mass Tort
Litigation, 88 Nw. U. L. REV. 469, 521 (1994) ("Aggregate settlements present yet an-
other problem of legal ethics. There is nothing that would seem on its face more
unethical (or more common) in mass litigation than for a defendant to offer an ag-
gregate settlement of all clients' claims and for plaintiffs' counsel to take it.").
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only type. Describing aggregate settlements as lump sum package
deals tends to obscure what makes settlements meaningfully collec-
tive. Closer inspection reveals that a lump sum package deal has two
key attributes. Each of these attributes has independent significance
and, I will argue, each should be sufficient to trigger the disclosure
and informed consent requirements of the ethics rule. The attributes
that combine to form a lump sum package deal are collective allocation
and collective conditionality.
III. A TYPOLOGY OF AGGREGATE SETTLEMENTS
Spreading these attributes-allocation and conditionality-along
the two axes of a grid, it is possible to create a typology of aggregate
settlements. Group settlements take various forms, and their essential
features can be understood in terms of different levels of collective-
ness in allocation and conditionality.
By allocation, I mean that aspect of the deal that governs settle-
ment amounts, the method for determining who gets how much.
Conditionality refers to what conditions must be met for the settlement
to stick, particularly the extent to which settlements are voidable by
defendants for failure to obtain releases from all the plaintiffs. When
authorities depict a deal in which the defendant pays an amount of
money in exchange for releases of an entire group of claims, the allo-
cation is lump sum, and the conditionality can be described as all-or-
nothing.
When the lump sum package deal is understood as a combina-
tion of allocation and conditionality attributes, and when that under-
standing is combined with an awareness of the range of settlement
structures used in multiparty litigation, it becomes evident that each
of these attributes appears in forms that range from purely collective
to purely independent. Allocation and conditionality can be spread
along two axes to form a simple grid of settlement structures:
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lump sum package deal
-I individual settlements
In Table 1, the black box in the upper left represents a lump sum
package deal, at the intersection of lump sum allocation and all-or-
nothing conditionality. Such a deal combines the most collective
form of allocation with the strongest collective condition. The settle-
ment is struck based on a total amount to be paid, without regard to
how much each plaintiff gets, and the deal is conditioned upon ac-
ceptance by the entire group. At the other extreme, the white box
represents individual settlements, at the intersection of individual allo-
cation and independent conditionality. Individual settlements involve
neither collective allocation nor collective conditions. The deal is
struck based on a particular amount negotiated on behalf of each in-
dividual plaintiff, and each plaintiff may accept or reject the offer
without affecting anyone else's settlement. Lump sum package deals
and individual settlements, however, do not exhaust the possibilities.
The gray area in Table 1 represents settlements that are neither fully
collective nor fully individual.
The gray area includes a variety of group settlement structures
that range from highly collective deals to relatively individualized
ones. Understanding what makes group settlements meaningfully col-
lective, and applying that understanding to lawyers' ethical obliga-
tions, requires a closer examination of settlement structures. In
particular, it requires an examination of the collective allocations and
collective conditions in settlements that are more individualized than
lump sum package deals, but more collective than individual settle-
ments. Table 2 shows that the gray area includes a number of settle-
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ment structures with collective allocations, collective conditions, or
both. By looking at the terms of any group settlement along the lines
of allocation and conditionality, it often should be possible to place












o0 " Matrix or
formula




* lump sum package deal
E other settlements with collective conditions and/or collective allocations
D] individual settlements
A. Allocation
In terms of allocation, multi-plaintiff settlements may fall into at
least six categories, shown on Table 2. The most collective are those
in which a defendant agrees to pay a lump sum to settle an entire
group of claims, leaving the allocation of that sum to the plaintiffs and
their lawyer. At the opposite end, the least collective agreements are
those in which each plaintiff's settlement amount is negotiated indi-
vidually. Between these extremes lie various methods of allocating set-
tlement funds among plaintiffs: negotiating individual amounts for
each plaintiff within a capped total amount, providing a fixed per cap-
ita amount for each plaintiff, determining each plaintiff's share by a
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formula or matrix, or setting up a claims mechanism to determine
values.
At the most collective end, lump sum deals are appealing to de-
fendants for the finality they bring 67 and tolerated by judges as an
efficient way to dispose of cases. 68 Mass tort defendants have used
them to resolve entire blocks of cases with plaintiffs' firms. 69 In the
diet drugs tort litigation, reports have indicated that the primary de-
fendant settled groups of claims on a lump sum basis.70 Lump sum
offers put plaintiffs' lawyers in an awkward position. Paul Rheingold
describes the scenario from the perspective of the plaintiffs' attorney:
You are handling a large number of cases arising out of the same
event, let us say clients all injured by the same drug product. Defen-
67 See Laws. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 51:379 (June 24, 1998) ("More
often, the proposal simply offers a lump sum to settle the entire matter."); Paul D.
Rheingold, How to Settle Your Inventory of Mass Tort Cases Ethically, in TORTS, INS. &
COMP. LAW SECTION, N.Y. STATE BAR ASS'N, FALL MEETING 165, 167 (2004).
68 SeeWEINSTEIN, supra note 22, at 74 ("Even though bulk settlements may techni-
cally violate ethical rules, judges often encourage their acceptance to terminate a
large number of cases."); Misko, supra note 21, at 4 ("Judges like them because they
help resolve large numbers of cases in one fell swoop.").
69 Judith Resnik noted the use of such settlements over a decade ago. Judith
Resnik, From "Cases" to "Litigation, "LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1991, at 5, 38
("While in theory and in form each case is separate, in practice lawyers on both sides
deal with the cases as a group, sometimes making 'block settlements'-in which de-
fendants give a lawyer representing a group of plaintiffs money that is then allocated
among a set of clients."). Paul Rheingold describes a fund settlement in the litigation
over the 1980 MGM Grand Hotel fire:
After settlements occurred of the representative cases, a fund was created in
1984 of approximately $168 million, not counting approximately $30 million
otherwise paid. This fund was placed in a Philadelphia bank, and was cre-
ated by each case agreeing on a sum it would take to settle as an individual
decision. All parties agreed that if the fund were short, each person's evalua-
tion would be reduced pro tanto, but if there was more than enough availa-
ble, each would be enlarged. The latter turned out to be the case and that
was that.
PAUL D. RHEINGOLD, MASS TORT LITIGATION § 14:18 (1996) (citing communication
from Plaintiffs Legal Committee member Leonard Ring).
70 See Mark Hamblett, New York Firm Accused of Intimidating Clients in Fen-Phen Liti-
gation, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 12, 2001, at 1 (discussing a lawsuit arising from a law firm's lump
sum settlement of over five thousand claims after plaintiffs had opted out of a nation-
wide class settlement); see also Brenda SapinoJeffreys, Stick to the Trial Plan, TEX. LAw.,
Jan. 31, 2000, at 19 (reporting that Houston plaintiffs' lawyer Michael Gallagher set-
tled the fen-phen claims of 1200 clients for a reported $350-500 million, hours after
winning a huge verdict for five plaintiffs in a Mississippi fen-phen trial); DavidJ. Mor-
row, American Home to Settle Some 1, 400 Fen-Phen Suits, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 1999, at C2
(reporting a $350 million settlement of Mississippi claims prior to approval of the
class settlement).
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dant's counsel comes to you and says that they want to dispose of
your entire inventory of cases. Either they ask how much will it take,
or, if they are more aggressive, they offer you a very large sum of
money to settle all your cases. They could care less how you appor-
tion it among your cases. Their client just does not want to spend
the time and money arguing over the value of the cases individually,
let alone cutting individual checks. 71
Plaintiffs' attorneys faced with lump sum settlement offers use va-
rious methods to allocate the money among their clients. 72 Some law-
yers allocate the funds themselves,7 3 which raises substantial concerns
about conflicts of interest and favoritism.7 4 Others have used special
masters, or sought the judge's involvement. 75 Another approach is to
encourage the clients themselves to work out a mutually acceptable
allocation. 76
71 Rheingold, supra note 67, at 167.
72 Silver and Baker point out that despite the wide variety of available methods
for dividing settlement funds, most often the task is left to the plaintiffs' lawyer:
Members of consensual group lawsuits have experimented with many ways of
allocating settlement funds. They have tried majority rule, mathematical for-
mulas and point systems, arbitration, and client-to-client negotiation. In our
experience, however, these arrangements are rare. It is far more common
for plaintiffs to make no special plans and to allow their lawyers to handle
the task of apportionment by default.
Silver & Baker, I Cut, You Choose, supra note 1, at 1505 (footnotes omitted).
73 In Bailey v. Mead S. Wood Products, 295 F. Supp. 2d 1286 (M.D. Ala. 2003), forty-
one plaintiffs in a pair of related cases authorized their lawyer to settle with the defen-
dant for a lump sum amount and "voted collectively to authorize [the lawyer] to ap-
portion the lump sum settlement amount as best he saw fit." Id. at 1287. Two of the
clients then objected to their allocation, one because he felt the attorney categorized
him incorrectly and the other because he felt the attorney should have awarded more
money to his entire category. The court found that "all of the plaintiffs covered by
the settlement agreement, including Bailey and Calhoun, authorized their attorney to
settle the case for a lump sum amount and authorized the attorney to divide up that
amount in a manner deemed appropriate by the attorney" and enforced the agree-
ment. Id. at 1289.
74 See Laws. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 51:379 Uune 24, 1998) ("If the
lawyer relies on his own conscience and personal evaluation of the merits of each
claim to divide the offered amount among clients, charges of favoritism may result.");
Rheingold, supra note 67, at 167 ("As many lawyers who have been in this position
know, the defendant's proposal is unethical-in the making and in the accepting.").
75 See Laws. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 51:379 (June 24, 1998); Wein-
stein, supra note 66, at 521.
76 Laws. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 51:379 (June 24, 1998) (noting that
this approach might make sense "[w]ith a relatively small group of clients") (citing
Ohio Ethics Op. 87-6 (1987)); Silver & Baker, I Cut, You Choose, supra note 1, at 1505
& n.132 (also noting that this is "[u]sed mainly when the number of plaintiffs is small,
e.g., a driver and a passenger injured in the same automobile accident").
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More subtle than a lump sum deal, but with similar effect from
the defendant's perspective, the lawyers may negotiate an individual
settlement amount for each plaintiff, subject to a cap on the total.
Such caps may be explicit or implicit. While each plaintiffs settle-
ment is individually negotiated, the total cap imposes significant inter-
dependence on the settlement amounts.
Another collective form of settlement is one that provides a fixed
per-plaintiff amount of compensation. An example is the settlement
of over 30,000 Norplant product liability claims for $1500 apiece. 77
Such settlements bear a superficial resemblance to settlements with
individually negotiated amounts, in that both types of settlements
specify the amount that each plaintiff receives. The interdependence
inherent in any deal in which a lawyer negotiates the same amount for
each of a large group of clients, however, distinguishes per capita
deals from individually negotiated settlements.
Third, a settlement may establish a formula or matrix for deter-
mining payments based on such factors as injury, age, and risk charac-
teristics, with a process for administering claims under the
settlement.78 Such settlements permit reasonably individualized valu-
ations, but with greater efficiency and predictability than individual
plaintiff-by-plaintiff negotiations. Settlement matrices have been used
in mass torts including DES79 and asbestos.80 The same general ap-
proach can be used for legislative resolution of mass liability, as evi-
77 Andrew Harris, Ruling Finishes Off Norplant Suits, NAT'L LJ., Sept. 30, 2002, at
B6.
78 See, e.g., RHEINGOLD, supra note 69, § 14:26 (describing the use of schedules or
grids to settle mass torts). In addition to the type of disease or injury, factors may
include age, degree of disability, and special damages. See id.
79 In the DES litigation, Eli Lilly negotiated a matrix settlement with a plaintiffs'
firm handling approximately 170 New York cases. Id. § 14:15. Over the course of
months, counsel for Eli Lilly and plaintiffs' counsel negotiated over categorizing the
injuries, determining payment amounts for each type of injury, deciding which legal
defenses applied, and other matters. "After many negotiating sessions, the process
led to creation of a matrix of major injury categories and subcategories. Ultimately a
standard payment was assigned to each subcategory and modifications were then
made as to the above factors, such as defenses or strength of proof." Id. After the
defendant and its insurers were satisfied with the settlement, the plaintiffs' firm
presented it to its individual clients, approximately ninety-five percent of whom ac-
cepted it. Id.
80 See id. § 14:26 (noting that "the asbestos schedules paid more for mesothe-
lioma than for asbestosis, which paid more than for pleural plaques"); Deborah Hen-
sler, As Time Goes By: Asbestos Litigation After Amchem and Ortiz, 80 TEx. L. REv. 1899,
1914 (2002) (noting the post-Amchem use of asbestos settlements that pay claimants.on a per capita basis or on the basis of an injury 'grid'").
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denced by the September 11 Victim Compensation Fund 8 and the
proposed asbestos legislation. 82 In sexual abuse litigation against the
Archdiocese of Louisville, the parties reached a settlement involving
243 plaintiffs, most of whom were represented by a single lawyer. 83
Although some of the participants suggested an equal distribution for
each plaintiff, the lead plaintiffs' lawyer, along with an attorney ap-
pointed by the court to oversee the settlement, divided the victims
into three categories based on the type of abuse, with award ranges for
each category.84
Fourth, a settlement may set up a mechanism such as a claims
facility or arbitration process for assigning values.85 A two-judge re-
view process, for example, was used to resolve the Love Canal toxic
81 See Pub. L. 10742, 115 Sta. 230 (2001).
82 See Fairness in Asbestos Injury Resolution Act of 2003 (FAIR Act), S. 1125,
108th Cong. Interestingly, a similar approach can be used even in cases ordinarily
viewed as individual rather than mass litigation, as Issacharoff and Witt demonstrate
in connection with the settlement of automobile accident claims by repeat-player in-
surance adjusters. See Issacharoff & Witt, supra note 5, at 1605.
83 See Laurie Goodstein, Archdiocese of Louisville Reaches Abuse Settlement, N.Y.
TIMES, June 11, 2003, at A18.
84 See Gregory A. Hall, 26 Object to Sex-Abuse Settlement, COURIER-JouRNAL (Louis-
ville), Oct. 2, 2003, at BI. The settlement plan, which was submitted for court ap-
proval, spelled out the categories of harm and the factors for determining amounts
within each range:
The first includes abuse in which the victim was an adult. It involves
nongenital sexual touching, exposure of genitals and a clothed abuser press-
ing against a clothed victim. Awards would range from $25,333 to $30,000.
The second class includes genital touching and masturbation, with
awards ranging from $75,750 to $110,000.
The third includes rape, sodomy, oral sex and digital penetration, with
awards ranging from $150,750 to $175,000.
Where plaintiffs would fall within those ranges would be determined by
such factors as age, duration of the abuse and aggravating circumstances
such as the involvement of drugs or alcohol in the abuse.
Id. Apparently the Louisville settlement was negotiated initially as a total amount of
$25.7 million, with the expectation that the allocation would be addressed subse-
quently with the court's involvement. See Peter Smith, Archdiocese to Pay Victims $25.7
Million for Sex Abuse, COURIER-JOURNAL (Louisville), June 11, 2003, at Al (reporting
the $25.7 million settlement and quoting plaintiffs' attorney William McMurry on the
allocation: "'The court will determine the methodology for apportioning the money
to the victims.... It is unknown at this time what the precise methodology will be'").
Thus, although the ultimate allocation plan involved a compensation matrix, the set-
tlement has the character of a lump sum deal.
85 In University Mechanical &Engineering Contractors, Inc. v. York International Corp.,
No. B161853, 2003 WL 22114173 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 12, 2003), three contractors in a
construction dispute with the county were represented by a single law firm. Prior to
settling with the opposing parties, the three entered into a Liquidating Agreement,
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tort litigation.8 6 A simple version of this type of allocation is the use of
a third party such as a mediator or special master to determine settle-
ment amounts. s7 A Boston church settlement of 542 sexual abuse
claims, for example, assigned a mediator to determine individual
amounts within the agreed range of $80,000 to $300,000, based on the
type and duration of abuse.88
Finally, deals may allocate specific amounts negotiated for each
plaintiff. As a mass tort treatise puts it, "[t]he old fashioned way to
arrive at settlement, where there is no congregation to sidetrack
things, is for the parties to sit down and negotiate one case at a
time."8 9 In the Baycol pharmaceutical litigation, Bayer agreed to ne-
gotiate settlements with individually determined amounts for each
plaintiff as part of a mediation program in the multidistrict litiga-
tion.90 In the church abuse cases, in contrast to the Louisville matrix
settlement, the Diocese of Covington, Kentucky, settled with twenty-
four plaintiffs represented by a single attorney for $4.4 million;
amounts were "negotiated individually based on such factors as the
severity of the abuse and its impact on the victims."91 In practice,
under which "the Contractors agreed to arbitration to apportion any recovery." Id. at
*2.
86 RHEINGOLD, supra note 69, § 14:22.
The funds in Love Canal were to be distributed after non-adversarial review
by two judges of the claims. Some claims contained big questions regarding
causation, for example, women claiming for varicose veins. Even before
knowing the amount to be awarded, almost 1,337 named plaintiffs agreed to
settle. Only nine refused.
Id.
87 See id. at § 14:16 ("Another method to establish case values, seemingly more
fair than others, but more expensive, is to use a neutral agent to appraise cases.").
88 See Fox Butterfield, Church in Boston to Pay $85 Million in Abuse Lawsuits, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 10, 2003, at Al; Katie Zezima, People Claiming Priest Abuse Learn of Settle-
ment Amounts, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 2003, at 39.
89 RHEINGOLD, supra note 69, § 14:12. Rheingold observes that even in case-by-
case negotiation, both sides use information about settlement values in other cases:
In a mass tort situation, the defendant may have devised a payoff scale that
will not, of course, be disclosed to plaintiffs. Nonetheless, plaintiffs' lawyers
will share information on previous cases and rely on their general experi-
ence, reports of any jury verdicts, and any other information gleaned from
payment schedules in other portions of the case.
Id.
90 See In re Baycol Prods. Litig., MDL 1431 (D. Minn. Feb. 14, 2003) (Order No.
64), available at http://www.mnd.uscourts.gov/Baycol-Mdl/pretrial_minutes/
baycol64.ord.pdf.
91 Peter Smith, Covington Diocese Will Pay $5 Million, COURIER-JOURNAL (Louis-
ville), Oct. 12, 2003, at Al (quoting attorney Angela Ford, who represented all twenty-
four of the settling plaintiffs).
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mass settlements, even if individually negotiated, necessarily resemble
matrix or formula settlements. The lawyers involved in any mature
mass tort know the range of values based on past trials and settle-ments, and therefore cannot really think of settlement values without
reference at least to an implicit matrix or formula based on strength
of claim, severity of harm, age, and other factors. There is a differ-
ence, however, between a settlement in which the lawyers strike the
deal by agreeing on the matrix or formula, with the idea that eachplaintiff's settlement can be computed accordingly, and a settlement
in which the lawyers negotiate each plaintiffs amount individually,
even if the latter is based on common understandings of values.
These six categories along the allocation axis do not exhaust the
possible techniques for allocating settlement funds. Undoubtedly
some approaches are not encompassed by these categories, and still
other settlement structures will be devised in the future, requiring re-thinking or expansion of the categories. Nor should the typology be
taken to imply that these allocation categories are neatly distinct from
each other. A settlement may combine features of multiple allocation
categories. For example, a lump sum fund may be divided based on amatrix, and the process of placing claimants into the matrix may be
handled by a claims facility.9 2 In a global settlement of dozens of law-
suits over the collapse of Philadelphia's Pier 34, the families of the
three women who died in the collapse each received a fixed amount
of $7.4 million, and another $7.4 million was to be distributed to theforty injured plaintiffs by a process of binding arbitration.93 The set-tlement thus combined a per capita allocation for one set of claimants
with a claims mechanism for the remaining claimants. The categories
of the typology, moreover, may apply in layers. For example, if a ma-trix settlement prescribes ranges rather than fixed dollar amounts,
then the determination of individual amounts within the applicable
ranges may be subject to individual negotiation or may use a claimsmechanism such as mediation. The typology is intended to facilitate amore precise understanding and description of collective settlements,
not to limit or oversimplify them.
B. Conditionality
Along the axis of conditionality, as shown on Table 2, settlements
divide into several levels. The most collective are all-or-nothing deals,
92 See RHEINGOLD, supra note 69, § 14:26.93 See L. Stuart Ditzen, Deal Reached in Pier Collapse, PHILA. INQUIRER,Jan. 29, 2004,at Al; Shannon P. Duffy, Philadelphia's Pier 34 Lawsuits Settle for $29.5 Million, LEGAL
INTELULGENCER, Jan. 30, 2004, at 1.
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in which the agreement fails unless it is accepted by every plaintiff
within the group. The least collective are independent settlements, in
which each client may accept or reject the agreement without affect-
ing the others. Between these two extremes are agreements with pro-
visions that permit parties to abandon the agreement if too few parties
agree to participate.
In an all-or-nothing deal, the defendant's settlement offer to each
plaintiff is conditioned on acceptance by every other plaintiff in the
group. Such deals, driven by defendants' desire for finality,94 are most
feasible when a single lawyer or firm represents the group of plain-
tiffs. 95 The Lawyers'Manual comments that "[1] awyers frequently seek
an all-or-nothing settlement in an effort to resolve a case once and for
all."9 6
In the same vein but more moderate, a settlement with a walk-
away provision gives the defendant the right to abandon the settle-
ment if more than a certain percentage of plaintiffs decline the of-
fers.97 Despite defendants' preference for total peace and plaintiffs'
lawyers' desire to resolve their clients' claims, both sides understand
that successful group settlements often require a safety valve that lets
94 See supra text accompanying notes 23-51.
95 A group of eighty-six sexual abuse plaintiffs represented by a single lawyer, for
example, settled their claims against the Archdiocese of Boston for ten million dol-
lars, apparently on an all-or-nothing basis. See Pam Belluck, $10 Million Accord Backed
by Plaintiffs in Boston Case, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 2002, at A26 (reporting that all eighty-
six plaintiffs had accepted the deal after spending the prior two weeks discussing their
options with their lawyer); Fox Butterfield & Pam Belluck, Boston Church Sees Settlement
in Abuse Case, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4, 2002, at Al (quoting Cardinal Law's lawyer as saying
that the agreement was still "tentative" because only eighty-five of the eighty-six plain-
tiffs had approved it).
96 Laws. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 51:375 (Feb. 3, 1999). Describing
offers of aggregate settlements, the Manual notes the frequency of such conditional
settlement deals: "The proposal typically offers an 'all or nothing' deal which will go
through only if all of opposing counsel's clients in the matter, or at least a specified
high percentage of clients, accept the agreement." Id. at 51:379.
97 Laws. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 51:379 (June 24, 1998) (describing,
as an alternative to an "all or nothing" deal, a deal that proceeds only if "a specified
high percentage of clients" accepts the agreement). Other names for the same type
of clause include "blow" or "blowout" provisions, or "right-to-withdraw" clauses. See
MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LrrIGATION (FOURTH) § 22.922 (2004) (describing the use of
"blow-out" clauses in opt-out class settlements); Richard A. Nagareda, The Preexistence
Principle and the Structure of the Class Action, 103 COLUM. L. REv. 149, 217 (2003)
(describing, in the context of class settlements, "a 'right-to-withdraw' clause: a provi-
sion in the settlement that empowers the defendant to withdraw from the deal 'if, in
its judgment, a substantial and material proportion of the class members have re-
quested exclusion'" (quoting 4 ALBA CONTE & HERBERT B. NEWBERG, NEWBERG ON
CLASS ACTIONS § 12:12, at 304 (4th ed. 2002))).
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dissatisfied plaintiffs decline the deal. They also know that an all-or-nothing deal gives each plaintiff the power to extort additional pay-ment by threatening to hold out. "Knowledgeable counsels will not
paint themselves into a corner whereby all of their clients must agree
to the plan. Given human nature and the variable way people see the
world, it is predictable that not all clients will take a predetermined
offer, no matter its. seeming reasonableness."98 An acceptance per-
centage of ninety percent has been used in some mass tort deals.99
Another settlement in the Boston church abuse litigation included arequirement of eighty percent acceptance; 100 ultimately, only ten out
of 552 plaintiffs declined the settlement.101
At the other extreme, settlement offers can be entirely indepen-
dent, permitting each plaintiff to accept or reject the offer without
affecting the deal for others. This is the form of settlement most con-
sistent with traditional norms of client autonomy. 02
Between these points on the axis, hybrid forms of settlements
combine aspects of the others. By structuring a settlement in tiers,
parties can impose different conditions on subgroups. As a variationhalfway between all-or-nothing and walk-away provisions, a tiered set-
tlement agreement may permit a defendant to withdraw unless the
settlement is accepted by, for example, one hundred percent of the
most serious category of claimants and ninety percent of the remain-
der. This structure has been used in asbestos litigation, in which de-
fendants have agreed to settle only if all or nearly all mesothelioma
plaintiffs accept the deal, but with a lower threshold of acceptance for
non-mesothelioma plaintiffs. 03 It was used, as well, in the settlement
of 1337 claims in the Love Canal toxic tort litigation. The Love Canalsettlement was tiered based on the claimants' severity of injury: "Forthe scheme to become binding, a set percentage of plaintiffs had to
execute a release. Of those seriously injured, none could opt out. Forless seriously injured, opt-outs were allowed, and overall there had to
be 90% acceptance." 104
98 Rheingold, supra note 67, at 170.
99 See id.
100 See Butterfield, supra note 88 ("At least 80 percent of them must accept [the
settlement] terms within 37 days for it to go into effect.").
101 See Zezima, supra note 88 (reporting that 542 victims had signed the agree-
ment and only ten did not participate).
102 See, e.g., MODEL RutL~s OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a) (1999).
103 SeeSilver & Baker, ICut, You Choose, supra note 1, at 1531 ("[D]efendants often
condition aggregate settlements on acceptance by a very high percentage of plaintiffswith high-value claims. If more than two or three mesothelioma victims decline a
defendant's offer, an entire settlement may collapse.").
104 RHEINGOLD, supra note 69, § 14:22.
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Alternatively, parties could negotiate the opposite variation: a
tiered settlement combining a walk-away portion and an independent
portion. In such a settlement, some of the plaintiffs could accept or
reject the deal independently, but the deal would be voidable if less
than a certain percent of some subgroup accepted the settlement.10 5
IV. THE TYPOLOGY AND THE AGGREGATE SETTLEMENT RULE
The typology described above helps define which settlement
structures should trigger the disclosure and informed consent re-
quirements of the ethics rule. By identifying those aspects of a settle-
ment that make the deal collective, the typology also suggests what
information must be disclosed to clients to obtain their informed con-
sent. The aggregate settlement rule can be understood as a particular
application of the rule on concurrent conflicts of interest. Both pre-
vent lawyers from trading off client interests against each other with-
out the clients' consent. 106 The comment to Model Rule 1.8(g) aptly
describes it as a corollary to both Rule 1.7, which addresses concur-
rent conflicts of interest, and Rule 1.2 (a), which protects client auton-
omy to decide whether to accept a settlement. 0 7
The top left cell of the grid represents lump sum package deals.
These are the quintessential aggregate settlements and the most prob-
lematic in terms of conflicts of interest. Lump sum package deals
clearly implicate the aggregate settlement rule.108
The bottom right cell represents a set of settlements with plain-
tiff-specific amounts, not conditioned on others' acceptance. In other
105 One could imagine a further variation on tiered settlements, in which a subset
of the settlements is all or nothing, and the remaining settlements are independent.
For example, an asbestos defendant settling a group of cases with a lawyer might
condition the deal on acceptance by all of the lawyer's mesothelioma clients, leaving
the remaining clients free to accept or reject the settlement without affecting the
overall deal. Whether such an all-or-nothing/independent tiered settlement struc-
ture should be considered more or less collective than a settlement with a straight
percentage walk-away provision depends on the relative size and importance of the
all-or-nothing subset, as well as the percentage requirement in the walk-away clause.
106 Geoffrey P. Miller, Conflicts of Interest in Class Action Litigation: An Inquiry into the
Appropriate Standard, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 581, 584 ("The purpose of the [aggregate
settlement] rule appears to be to prevent attorneys from trading off the interests of
clients without their informed consent."); Silver & Baker, Aggregate Settlement Rule,
supra note 1, at 734; see also Laws. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 51:378 (June
24, 1998) (discussing the purposes of the aggregate settlement rule).
107 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.8 cmt. 13 (2003).
108 See N.J. Advisory Comm. on Prof'l Ethics, Formal Op. 616 (1988); Or. State Bar
Legal Ethics Comm., Formal Op. 2000-158 (2000); S.C. Bar Ethics Advisory Comm.,
Op. 95-02 (1995).
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words, the amount for each plaintiff was negotiated individually on
behalf of that client, and each client is free to accept or reject the
settlement without effect on other clients. In terms of the policies
underlying the aggregate settlement rule, these settlements should be
considered non-aggregate even if lawyers negotiate a number of settle-
ments at one sitting and thus conceive of the settlements as a group.
Some bundles of apparently individual settlements involve implicit
caps or other tradeoffs and thus should be understood as aggregate
deals, 10 9 but not every bundle of individual settlements constitutes an
aggregate settlement.l 0
But lump sum package deals and individual settlements do not
account for the entire universe of settlements. Many settlements fall
somewhere between fully collective and fully independent on the axes
of allocation and conditionality, and defining the characteristics of
those settlements is essential to understanding whether they should
trigger the obligations of the aggregate settlement rule.
Disaggregating the attributes of collective settlements helps clar-
ify the justifications for the rule and counsels a relatively broad appli-
cation. Aside from individual, independent settlements, every other
applicable combination of allocation and conditionality constitutes a
form of collective settlement and should be subject to disclosure andinformed consent requirements. But important differences remain,
and the argument for applying the aggregate settlement rule differs
depending on the type of settlement. Table 3-the most complete
depiction of the typology-shows the various types of aggregate settle-
ments based on collective conditions and collective allocations.
A. Collective Conditions as a Basis for Defining Aggregate Settlements
Any settlement with collective conditions should be governed bythe aggregate settlement rule because collective conditions create law-
yer-client and client-client conflicts of interest. In an all-or-nothing
package deal, or one that gives the defendant a basic or tiered walk-
away clause, the plaintiffs' lawyer faces an incentive to get the deal
done by pressuring individual clients to accept the settlement.'' This
pits the lawyer's self-interest, as well as the interest of other clients,
109 See infra text accompanying note 135.
110 See infra text accompanying notes 134-38.
111 Judge Weinstein observes that despite the client's theoretical autonomy in de-
ciding whether to participate in the settlement, lawyers wield enormous power overtheir clients' decisionmaking in this regard. "Theoretically, each client has the option
of rejecting his share of a settlement .... In practice the attorney almost always canmake a global settlement and convince the clients to accept it." Weinstein, supra note
66, at 521 n.212.
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I aggregate settlement based on collective conditions and zero-sum allocation
[i aggregate settlement based on collective conditions and linked allocation
aggregate settlement based on zero-sum allocation
[] aggregate settlement based on linked allocation
D aggregate settlement based on collective conditions
FD individual settlements
against the interest of a client who does not wish to accept the settle-
ment. This conflict makes it essential for plaintiffs to retain the right
to decline the settlement individually after disclosure of the overall
terms of the deal. Each client should understand that the lawyer may
have an eye on more than the individual client's interest.
Even in a single-client settlement, of course, a lawyer's interest
may conflict with a client's interest in maximizing recovery, particu-
larly where the cost and risk of going to trial are borne disproportion-
ately by the lawyer. The aggregate settlement rule, however, reflects
an important difference between individual and collective settle-
ments. It may be presumed that each client understands that her law-
yer has an interest in her case and an interest in obtaining a fee.
Without the disclosure required by the aggregate settlement rule,
however, it may not be presumed that the client understands that the
lawyer has an interest in a number of other cases and that the lawyer's
20051 1797
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
interest in those other cases may have affected the negotiation of this
client's settlement. 11 2
All-or-nothing deals present the most extreme form of the con-
flict because they give the lawyer a powerful incentive to pressure
every client-even those who are most dissatisfied with the settle-
ment-to accept the agreement."13 Walk-away settlements include
the safety valve of permitting some clients to decline their share of the
settlement without spoiling the deal for the other clients and for their
lawyer. Nonetheless, in terms of what makes a settlement meaning-
fully collective, there is no bright line between all-or-nothing settle-
ments and walk-away or tiered walk-away settlements. All of theminvolve collective conditions and thus present the lawyer-client and
client-client conflicts of interest. A settlement with a walk-away provi-sion set at ninety-nine percent, for example, functions almost identi-
cally to an all-or-nothing settlement in that the lawyer has a strong self-interest in ensuring that virtually every client accepts the deal, and
clients who favor the settlement are pitted against those who do not.
The higher the proportion permitted to decline the settlement, the
112 I thank Suzanna Sherry for this insight.
113 A New Jersey attorney, representing a number of plaintiff employees in a toxic
chemical case, sought ethics committee advice concerning a "contingent blanket of-fer" made by the defendants' lawyers. "The defendants' attorneys advised that theywould not make the offer unless they could be assured that every plaintiff would ac-cept the proposal." N.J. Advisory Comm. on Prof'l Ethics, Formal Op. 616 (1988).The inquiring attorney stated that the defense lawyers told him "that if the proposalwere rejected by any more than an extremely inconsequential number of plaintiffs,they would not recommend such payment to their clients." Rather, if the agreement
were not accepted by virtually all the plaintiffs, the defendants would make individualoffers to certain plaintiffs but would move to dismiss about one hundred plaintiffs onstatute of limitations grounds. Id. The lawyer communicated the offer to his clients.
He described their reaction as follows:
[T] here was reluctance on the part of a fairly substantial number of plaintiffs
to accept the settlement. However, when it was explained that if the settle-
ment offer was not accepted, perhaps a hundred of their co-workers might
have their claims dismissed, all but a very inconsequential number of plain-
tiffs accepted this settlement, and a separate settlement conference was held
to resolve the claims of those few plaintiffs who had not accepted the settle-
ment proposal.
Id. The committee simply advised the lawyer that the situation was governed by Rule1.8(g). For purposes of the present Article, what is most interesting about Opinion
616 is how the inquirer's story demonstrates the pressure that can be brought to bearon clients to accept a settlement when the deal incorporates strong collective condi-tions such as an all-or-nothing provision or a walk-away clause with a high acceptance
requirement.
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larger the safety valve, but the meaningful line is between settlements
with collective conditions and those without. 114
It may seem that settlements with individually negotiated com-
pensation but collective conditions-those identified in Table 3 as ag-
gregate settlements based on collective conditions-should be considered
non-aggregate. Indeed, some courts have expressed an understand-
ing of the aggregate settlement rule that might be interpreted to ex-
clude settlements with individually negotiated amounts of
compensation. 115 The policies underlying the aggregate settlement
rule, however, compel a different conclusion. Conditioning the settle-
ment on an overall acceptance rate creates a conflict of interest that
necessitates disclosure and informed consent, even if compensation
amounts are negotiated individually for each plaintiff.
B. Collective Allocation as a Basis for Defining Aggregate Settlements
For different reasons, any settlement with collective allocation
should trigger the rule. Whereas the primary concern with collective
conditions is a lawyer-client conflict of interest, the primary concern
with collective allocation is a client-client conflict of interest. Individ-
ual clients may fare better or worse than others in a collectively allo-
cated settlement."16  While this problem finds its most severe
manifestation in lump sum deals, the concern pervades settlements
114 One could argue, with plausible symmetry, that a settlement with a walk-away
provision set at one percent would function almost identically to a settlement in
which each client is free to accept or reject the settlement without any collective con-
ditions. On this argument, there is no bright line at either end of the conditionality
axis; it is simply a matter of varying degrees of independence or interdependence.
The flaw in this argument is that the very reason to include a walk-away provision in a
multiparty settlement is for the defendant to ensure that enough plaintiffs accept the
settlement to give the defendant some finality. As a practical matter, therefore, walk-
away provisions' acceptance requirements always fall closer to one hundred percent
than zero.
115 See, e.g., Scrivner v. Hobson, 854 S.W.2d 148, 152 (Tex. App. 1993) (describ-
ing an aggregate settlement as one "for which no individual negotiations on behalf of
any one client were undertaken by the attorney" in the context of applying the aggre-
gate settlement rule to an issue of attorney-client privilege); see also Attorney Griev-
ance Comm'n v. Engerman, 424 A.2d 362, 368 (Md. 1981) (finding insufficient
evidence to prove that an attorney made an aggregate settlement because separate
payments were received for individual clients).
116 Charles Silver and Lynn Baker examine these inter-plaintiff conflicts in aggre-
gate settlements and acknowledge their seriousness, but conclude that "lawyers repre-
senting both consensual and nonconsensual litigation groups must be allowed to
make inter-plaintiff tradeoffs in the course of litigation and should also be allowed to
participate in the allocation process." Silver & Baker, I Cut, You Choose, supra note 1,
at 1468.
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with collective allocations, whether lump sum, total cap, per capita,
matrix, formula, or claims mechanism. Without disclosure of the
scope and terms of the deal, clients lack sufficient information to
judge the adequacy of collectively allocated settlement offers, because
they lack plaintiff-specific negotiations to rely on as an indicator of
value. In addition, collective allocation sometimes presents a lawyer-
client conflict, particularly in situations where the lawyer stands to
benefit by favoring certain clients.
As shown on Table 3, collective allocations can be divided into
two categories. Both involve connected settlement amounts, but they
differ in the nature of the connection. Lump sum settlements and
settlements subject to a total cap involve zero-sum interdependence. In
these types of settlements, the more one client receives, the less others
receive. 1 17 Other collective allocations involve linked allocation. In
these types of deals, though not zero-sum, plaintiffs' settlement
amounts are nonetheless linked to each other. In one sense, the
linked allocation in per capita and matrix settlements is nearly the
opposite of zero-sum interdependence. In a per capita deal, the more
one client receives, the more the others receive. Similarly, in a matrix
deal, a higher amount for one client means a higher amount for
others, at least within the same matrix category. This contrasts with
lump sum deals, in which one client's gain is another's loss. On the
other hand, some matrix deals may be zero-sum in terms of overall
tradeoffs, but involving conflicts between groups rather than between
individuals. On either view, all types of collective allocation involve
tradeoffs and thus create conflicts of interest that trigger the disclo-
sure and consent requirements of the aggregate settlement rule.
In a per capita settlement, each plaintiff gets the same amount of
compensation. It is uncommon, however, for each plaintiffs claim to
be identical to the others.1 1 8 If some plaintiffs' claims are stronger
117 Unlike lump sum settlements, aggregate settlements with a total cap are truly
zero-sum only if the cap is reached. Below the cap, there remains room to expand or
reduce the total settlement amount. As a general matter, however, it is fair to charac-
terize these settlements as involving an interdependence in which a greater settle-
ment amount for one client diminishes the settlement position of the others.
118 Consumer antitrust and consumer fraud cases in which each consumer pur-
chased the same good or service may present the strongest situations for per capita
settlements. Microsoft recently has settled consumer antitrust class actions with iden-
tical vouchers for each consumer who purchased particular products. See Dan Chris-
tensen, Consumers to Get $202M in Coupons from Microsoft Class Action, BROWARD DAILY
Bus. REV., Dec. 15, 2002, at 11 (describing a Florida settlement in which "the com-
pany will issue coupons to purchasers worth $5 to $12 for each product that was
bought during the period covered by the litigation"); Brenda Sandburg, Microsoft Set-
tilement Getting Another Look, THE RECORDER, Mar. 30, 2004, at 1 (describing a Califor-
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than others because of differences in harm or available defenses, then
the settlement overcompensates some while undercompensating
others. 1 19 To make an informed decision about the acceptability of
the settlement, each plaintiff needs to know that others are receiving
the same deal and that the amount was not negotiated individually.
Similarly, settlements in which funds are allocated pursuant to a
formula, matrix, or claims mechanism involve tradeoffs that may leave
some clients better off than others. Because such settlements use col-
lective methods of allocating funds, rather than plaintiff-by-plaintiff
settlement negotiation, clients must understand the deal as a whole in
order to make an informed decision on whether to accept it.120
The most serious concern involves lump sum settlements that
leave the ultimate allocation to the plaintiffs' lawyer. Such arrange-
ments present a risk of favoritism, especially if the lawyer has a finan-
cial interest that conflicts with equitable allocation of the settlement.
For example, the attorney may be entitled to the entire fee from cli-
ents who came directly to the firm, but entitled to only part of the fee
from clients who were referred by other lawyers. Paul Rheingold ex-
plains the potential client-lawyer conflicts:
A law firm with a large inventory has some cases referred to it,
whereby it has to give up a forwarding fee. Other cases came di-
rectly from the client. The more the settlements are paid to those
who have no forwarder, the more the law firm makes. The law firm
will, therefore, be more inclined to favor those clients who came
directly to the law firm. Other examples of favoring one client over
another include favoring a "squeaky wheel" client, favoring a rela-
tive, or favoring a friend of the family. 12 1
nia settlement under which "Microsoft is providing up to $1.1 billion in vouchers to
14 million Californians who indirectly purchased Microsoft software from 1995 to
2001"). In mass tort cases, while a per capita settlement for personal injuries would
be difficult to justify, such a settlement might work for exposure-only claims to the
extent they are permitted under applicable tort law. Even exposure-only claims, how-
ever, may involve different levels of risk for individual plaintiffs.
119 Not only do plaintiffs' claims differ in strength on the facts and law, but plain-
tiffs differ in their willingness to settle or proceed to trial. Silver and Baker make this
point in the context of showing the similarity between class representation and alloca-
tion of settlement payments: "Every litigation group contains plaintiffs with different
attitudes toward risk, with different views on the time-value of money, and with differ-
ent desires for relief." Silver & Baker, I Cut, You Choose, supra note 1, at 1492.
120 Paul Rheingold describes the reaction of his clients to a settlement of 170 DES
cases, in which about ninety-five percent of the clients accepted the settlement values
established by a matrix of disease categories and other factors: "Important to their
decision was that all women who had a similar case factually would get the same sum."
RHEINGOLD, supra note 69, § 14:15.
121 See Rheingold, supra note 1, at 396-97.
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A similar conflict may arise if lawyers use a sliding scale contin-
gent fee 122 rather than a fixed percentage. If the fees will be paid on a
decreasing scale, then the lawyer has an incentive to spread settle-
ments more evenly by reducing the allocations for plaintiffs with the
strongest claims in order to keep individual settlements under certain
break points.
Lump sum package deals raise such significant conflicts that they
generally should be avoided. Because they present the most extreme
version of both sets of conflicts-those associated with collective allo-
cation and those associated with collective conditionality-lump sum
package deals are the most problematic type of aggregate
settlement. 123
Excessive focus on the dangers of lump sum package deals, how-
ever, can obscure the conflicts presented by lesser forms of collective
allocation. Thus, in seeking settlement methods to avoid the
problems of lump sum deals, lawyers must be careful not to assume
that other allocation techniques get around the informed consent re-
quirement of the aggregate settlement rule. One lawyer, teaching an
ethics session at a continuing legal education program on asbestos
litigation, described efforts to avoid the rule: "Many attorneys attempt
to overcome the problems of Rule 1.8 through the appointment of
122 See, e.g., N.J. Ct. R. 1:21-7 (imposing a statutory contingent fee cap for tort cases
on a downward sliding scale).
123 From the perspective of rational dealmaking for defendants, any settlement
with a lump sum allocation is likely to include all-or-nothing conditionality, or at least
a walk-away provision with a high acceptance requirement, as it is implausible that any
defendant would offer a lump sum to settle an undetermined number of claims. If a
defendant were to offer a lump sum to settle a block of cases, but each plaintiff were
free to decline without affecting the overall deal, then the plaintiffs' lawyer might
urge clients with strong claims to decline the deal and divide the funds among the
remaining clients. The deal would make no sense for the defendant unless the defen-
dant had some knowledge or control over the allocation among plaintiffs, or unless
the defendant had a reasonable expectation that all or nearly all of the plaintiffs
would accept the deal. Thus, if a settlement appears on the surface to be a lump sum
deal in which the defendant did not participate in allocating settlement amounts, and
in which claimants independently accept or reject the offer (i.e., a settlement that
apparently would fit in the upper right box on Table 3: "Lump sum, Independent"),
the settlement may well contain either an unstated agreement as to allocation or an
understanding between counsel that all of the plaintiffs are expected to accept the
deal. On the allocation axis, if the settlement includes an implicit agreement as to
the allocation of settlement amounts based on injury categories or other factors, then
it is better described not as a lump sum settlement, but rather as an implicit matrix
settlement. On the conditionality axis, if the settlement includes an implicit under-
standing that the deal fails unless all of the claimants accept it, then it is better de-
scribed as an all-or-nothing deal rather than independent.
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special masters to set damage amounts, or through the use of elabo-
rate consent procedures authorizing counsel to settle within a range
of numbers or approving a specific number within a specified
range."1 2 4 Paul Rheingold, a plaintiffs' lawyer and the author of a
treatise on mass torts, agrees that lawyers can avoid the requirements
of the aggregate settlement rule by allowing a third party to allocate
the funds:
A third way to do an aggregate settlement which has met with some
approval is to shift some of the decision making to some impartial
person-judge, magistrate, special master, mediator, or the like....
It would appear that, if properly handled, this method of using a
mediator or some other impartial person will generally avoid the
stricture against aggregate settlements. At least the attorney alone is
not making the divisions of a round sum. 1 2 5
Although these authors correctly note that it is helpful to insulate
the attorney from single-handed allocation decisions, they are wrong
in thinking that the aggregate settlement rule is not implicated by set-
tlements that use third party decisionmakers or other collective alloca-
tion mechanisms. Using a knowledgeable third party to allocate funds
among multiple plaintiffs can be an excellent way to increase the like-
lihood of a reasonable allocation and to inspire confidence among
clients that they are being treated fairly. It is also a sensible way for
plaintiffs' lawyers to take some pressure off of themselves and to re-
duce any concerns that the lawyers may use the settlement allocation
to play favorites or to manipulate fees. It is not, however, a way to
avoid the requirements of disclosure and informed consent. Delegat-
ing the allocation decisions to a third party removes the lawyer-client
conflict and the risk that the lawyer will play favorites, but most of the
client-client conflict remains. On Table 3, these are the settlements in
the fifth row, in which allocation is achieved by a claims mechanism.
Such settlements are not prohibited, but as with other settlements in-
volving collective :llocation, clients need to know the terms of the
deal in order to make an informed decision about whether the settle-
ment treats them fairly and whether they choose to accept it.
124 Richard C. Stanley, Ethics in Asbestos: An Oxymoron ?, ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY-
ASBESTOS LITIGATION IN THE TwEN-y-FmisT CENTURY 369, 378 (2003). Stanley cautions
that these approaches are not foolproof: "These methods, while widely used, have not
been extensively reviewed in ethics opinions, and thus entail some degree of risk if
not done properly." Id.
125 Rheingold, supra note 67, at 170; see also RHEINGOLD, supra note 69, § 14:16 ("If
the neutral can create categories of cases, set at least relative values on those cases,
and slot each case into the appropriate category, the result should be acceptable both
to the parties and ethical rules.").
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Rheingold has proposed another settlement technique, which he
calls the "three-step grid" method, 126 for avoiding the mandates of the
aggregate settlement rule.
Step one is to meet with defense counsel and work out some sort of
grid for the injuries involved in the group of cases.... Defense and
plaintiffs' counsel tentatively assign a sum of money to each pigeon-
hole in the grid.
Step two is to meet with your clients, individually or in a group
... ,and to work toward an agreement as to what pigeon hole each
will fall in and to show them what amount they would get-and
then to get their consent to the sum....
Step three is for counsel to return to the defendant and negoti-
ate a total settlement. This depends of course upon an agreement
as into which category each case fits. 127
Rheingold describes the typical negotiation process, in which plain-
tiffs' counsel may demand more money "on the basis that the clients
were not happy with the sums in the grid,"'128 and defendants may
demand a high acceptance rate. "A common approach is to set a per-
centage which must accept the plan before it goes into effect."'129
This three-step approach may be a highly effective way to achieve
settlements, but treating it as a way to circumvent the aggregate settle-
ment rule is both erroneous and unnecessary. Rather than providing
a way to avoid the aggregate settlement rule, the three-step approach
can provide a structure for complying with the rule. Examination of
the three-step grid technique in light of the typology reveals both col-
lective allocation and collective conditions. The allocation is set col-
lectively using a matrix; settlement amounts are not negotiated
plaintiff-by-plaintiff. The conditionality is established by a walk-away
provision that requires a certain acceptance rate before the payment
program takes affect. In other words, the three-step grid method, as
described by Rheingold, fits squarely in an aggregate settlement box
of the typology as shown on Table 3-matrix allocation and walk-away
conditionality. The approach does not eliminate the need for in-
formed consent, but the necessary disclosure and consent can be in-
corporated into the process. After the deal is negotiated in step three,
plaintiffs' counsel must disclose the final terms of the deal to the cli-
ents, including the categories in the compensation matrix and the set-
tlement amounts for each category and subcategory, as well as any
126 See Rheingold, supra note 1, at 403; Rheingold, supra note 67, at 169.
127 Rheingold, supra note 67, at 169-70.
128 Id. at 70.
129 Id.
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collective conditions and other material provisions. Depending on
how step two is handled, much of this information may already be
familiar to the clients. Each client may choose whether to accept the
settlement, and those who accept it must put their consent in
writing. 13 0
Excessive focus on lump sum package deals also may be to blame
for the misconception that the aggregate settlement rule requires
unanimity. Indeed, this "unanimity" mindset may be what has driven
commentators to suggest ways to avoid the rule, which sometimes is
described misleadingly as a prohibition on aggregate settlements 31
when it is better understood as a disclosure and consent requirement.
Plaintiffs' lawyer Fred Misko, for example, writes: "The consent re-
quirement has been construed to require unanimity among all plain-
tiffs. Thus, in theory an aggregate settlement fails if even one client
out of the entire group of plaintiffs refuses consent."132 He complains
that unanimity is difficult to achieve in a mass tort case: "While con-
sulting with and gaining the unanimous consent of several plaintiffs is
relatively manageable, doing the same where there are hundreds or
thousands of plaintiffs in a mass tort case can be an extremely difficult
and expensive undertaking.' 33 The aggregate settlement rule, how-
ever, does not require unanimity, at least not in the sense Misko sug-
gests. Rather, it mandates that no party be bound by a settlement
unless that party agrees to it after full disclosure. This amounts to a
130 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCt R. 1.8(g) (1983). The particulars, such
as the requirement of a signed writing, may vary depending on the state's version of
the aggregate settlement rule.
131 See, e.g., Rheingold, supra note 67, at 477 ("[W]e must come up with alterna-
tives that at least seek to satisfy the reasons underlying the rule against aggregate
settlements.. . ."); Weinstein, supra note 66, at 521.
There is nothing that would seem on its face more unethical (or more com-
mon) in mass litigation than for a defendant to offer an aggregate settle-
ment of all clients' claims and for plaintiffs' counsel to take it.
Even though bulk settlements may technically violate ethical rules, judges
often encourage their acceptance to terminate a large number of cases.
Id.
132 Misko, supra note 21, at 4; see also Silver & Baker, I Cut, You Choose, supra note
1, at 1469 (describing the rule as requiring "unanimous consent"). Because Profes-
sors Silver and Baker treat the rule largely as requiring unanimity, they devote signifi-
cant attention to the risk of extortionate holdouts. See Silver & Baker, Aggregate
Settlement Rule, supra note 1, at 767 ("A strategic plaintiff with little at stake in a law-
suit ... can therefore make a credible threat to veto a desirable group deal unless
paid a disproportionately large amount."); Silver & Baker, I Cut, You Choose, supra
note 1, at 1520, 1532.
133 Misko, supra note 21, at 4.
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"unanimity" requirement only in an all-or-nothing deal. At other
points along the conditionality axis, nonunanimity does not void the
deal, but simply positions a particular client outside the transaction.
In sum, collective allocation methods can provide fair and effi-
cient ways to divide settlement funds among a group of clients, but
that does not render the aggregate settlement rule inapplicable. On
the contrary, whenever a settlement is allocated collectively, the client
still retains the right to decide whether to accept the deal. For that
decision to be meaningful, the client must be informed of the basis on
which the individual amount was determined and above all must un-
derstand that the amount was not negotiated individually on behalf of
that client.
C. Individual Settlements
Not all settlements negotiated by a multi-plaintiff lawyer should
be deemed aggregate settlements for purposes of the ethics rule. If
the amounts are negotiated individually for each plaintiff, and if the
settlements are not conditioned on others' acceptance, then the deal
ordinarily should be considered non-aggregate. Lawyers may negoti-
ate a group of such settlements at one sitting, but that does not make
them aggregate.134 Sometimes, a bundle of individual settlements is
simply a bundle of individual settlements.
This definition of non-aggregate settlements presents a risk that
lawyers may try to avoid the strictures of the aggregate settlement rule
by presenting their deals as bundles of individual settlements. It is
important, therefore, when courts and ethics authorities face ques-
tions about the propriety of particular settlements, that they look be-
hind lawyers' descriptions of their deals. Determining whether a deal
constitutes an aggregate settlement requires looking at whether the
settlement amounts were established by a collective allocation such as
134 The Lauyers' Manual suggests that certain settlements with individual amounts
may constitute aggregate settlements: "Aggregate settlement proposals sometimes
specify the amounts for each client. A lawyer who receives such a proposal may not
alter the sums offered to each client without telling them." Laws. Man. on Prof. Con-
duct (ABA/BNA) 51:379 (June 24, 1998) (citing La. Ethics Op. 94-056 (1994)). Per-
haps the Manual assumes a defendant's offer to plaintiffs' counsel with specific
amounts offered to each plaintiff. To the extent the amounts were not reached by
plaintiff-specific negotiation, or are subject to collective conditions, it makes sense to
treat the offer as a type of aggregate settlement. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE
LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 128 cmt. d(i), illus. 2 (2000). However, if the settlement
specifies amounts for each client that are subject to plaintiff-specific negotiation and
that are unburdened by collective conditions, the policies underlying the aggregate
settlement rule do not require such a settlement to be considered aggregate.
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a grid or formula rather than by individual plaintiff-specific negotia-
tion and whether the lawyers have an explicit or implicit side deal that
imposes collective conditions on the settlements.
The typology of aggregate settlements in Table 3 lays out a grid of
thirty categories of settlements, based on five levels of conditionality
and six types of allocation, with the understanding that hybrids and
variations make the reality more complex than those thirty categories.
For purposes of defining which settlements are subject to the disclo-
sure and informed consent requirements of the aggregate settlement
rule, however, the typology treats two lines as more significant than
the others: the line that separates independent from collective condi-
tionality and the line that separates individual from collective alloca-
tion. The result is to define independent, individual settlements as
non-aggregate and all others as aggregate.
While the typology highlights the significance of these two lines,
in reality, neither line is particularly bright. Along the axis of alloca-
tion, settlements may appear as individual amounts but more realisti-
cally be negotiated on a collective basis due to implicit caps or an
implicit matrix. Even without an explicit cap on the sum of a group of
settlements, lawyers may negotiate with an understanding of how
much the defendant is willing to spend to settle a group of claims.
The implicit threat of bankruptcy, too, can operate as an aggregate
cap on settlements. Thus, the distinction between "individual
amounts" and "total cap" allocation may be less meaningful than it
appears. Moreover, in any mature mass litigation, even if lawyers ne-
gotiate each plaintiffs settlement individually, they conceive of settle-
ment values in terms of ranges based on the factors relevant to
valuation, even if the deal is not formally structured as a matrix or
formula. Thus, the line between "individual amounts" and "matrix or
formula" allocation, too, may be less meaningful than it appears.
Similar boundary problems occur along the conditionality axis.
Even if a deal does not appear to contain an all-or-nothing or walk-
away provision, similar conditions may be unstated. The lawyers may
share an expectation that the plaintiffs' lawyer will persuade all or
nearly all of the clients to accept the deal and an expectation that the
lawyer will not take on new clients in the same litigation.1 3 5 Thus, the
line between independent and collective conditionality may be no
more satisfying than the lines between types of allocation.
An intriguing question is whether aggregate settlements can in-
clude not only simultaneous settlements of claims, but also settle-
135 On the ethical prohibition against restricting future law practice, see supra
note 50.
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ments that occur seriatim. 136 The typology, as developed in thisArticle, works on the assumption that aggregate settlements involvethe resolution of multiple claims at the same time, as part of a single
broader deal. Related claims, however, may be settled over the courseof time and may be subject to implicit caps or matrices. Settlement ofa series of individual clients' claims thus may implicate client-client
conflict concerns similar to those in simultaneous settlements. Insum, a seemingly individualized cluster of case-by-case settlements,
whether simultaneous or seriatim, may involve allocation tradeoffs.Extending the aggregate settlement rule to facially individual settle-ments, however, is difficult enough even for a simultaneous group ofsettlements. Extending the rule even further to seriatim settlementswould be unworkable. When collective representation leads to a se-ries of related settlements, the sounder approach is for the lawyer toobtain informed consent at the outset to the conflicts of interest. 137
Given the fuzziness of the lines separating independent, individ-ual settlements from collective ones, it may appear tempting to defineaggregate settlements where the lines may appear brighter-at the ex-plicit lump sum package deal.1 38 But the policies of the aggregate
settlement rule-both as to conflicts of interest and as to the duty togive clients the information they need in order to decide whether toaccept a settlement-dictate that the rule apply to all settlements inwhich collective conditions or allocations create conflicts of interest oraffect the information clients need in order to understand the settle-ment. Application of the disclosure and informed consent require-ments should not be restricted to only the most obvious type of
aggregate settlement.
D. Required Disclosures
To satisfy the informed consent requirement of the aggregate set-tlement rule, a lawyer must disclose "the existence and nature of allthe claims or pleas involved and of the participation of each person inthe settlement." 13 9 The typology identifies the aspects of a group set-tlement that may create client-client and lawyer-client conflicts of in-terest and thus points to the information that clients need in order to
make an informed decision.
136 I thank Allan Erbsen and Jill Hasday for raising this issue.
137 See Erichson, supra note 1, at 558-67.
138 This may explain why some authorities, attempting to define aggregate settle-ments, describe lump sum package deals. See supra notes 62-66 and accompanying
text.
139 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT 1. 8 (g) (1999).
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Suppose, for example, a lawyer represents two hundred plaintiffs
with related claims against a single defendant. The lawyer negotiates
with the defendant to settle the two hundred claims based on a com-
pensation matrix, with a ninety-five percent walkaway provision, and
suppose a particular client would receive $100,000 under the deal.
The deal is an aggregate settlement based on a linked allocation and a
collective condition. Under the aggregate settlement rule, the lawyer
may not simply tell the client that the defendant has offered $100,000,
which the lawyer believes is a fair settlement. Rather, the lawyer must
explain to the client that the offer constitutes part of a broader deal.
At a minimum, the lawyer's disclosure should inform the client of the
terms of the matrix on which settlement amounts are based and
should inform the client that the settlement is conditioned upon
ninety-five percent acceptance by the group of two hundred clients.
By disclosing those aspects of the deal that make it collective, and thus
the aspects that involve tradeoffs among competing interests, the law-
yer gives the client the information necessary for the client to make a
reasoned decision about whether to accept the settlement notwith-
standing the conflicts of interest inherent in an aggregate settlement.
E. Waiver and the Problem of Holdouts
The typology also may prove useful in connection with arguments
over whether clients should be permitted to waive their rights under
the aggregate settlement rule. As currently understood, the rule does
not allow clients to agree ex ante to be bound by majority rule on
settlement offers, for example.1 40 Charles Silver and Lynn Baker have
argued in favor of permitting ex ante waiver, based largely on the risk
that holdouts will undermine collective action.
14 1
Looking at this problem in light of the typology of aggregate set-
tlements, the argument for waiver is strongest for settlements high on
the conditionality axis, particularly all-or-nothing agreements. The ar-
gument is weaker for settlements lower on the conditionality axis,
where there is little risk of extortionate holdouts. If one expects most
defendants to avoid insisting upon all-or-nothing package deals, and
140 See Hayes v. Eagle-Picher Indus., 513 F.2d 892 (10th Cir. 1975); see also Abbott
v. Kidder Peabody & Co., 42 F. Supp. 2d 1046 (D. Colo. 1999) (voiding a "steering
committee" arrangement under which the committee could enter a binding settle-
ment on behalf of all plaintiffs).
141 See Silver & Baker, Aggregate Settlement Rule, supra note 1; see also Silver & Baker,
I Cut, You Choose, supra note 1, at 1500-06 (outlining the economic results flowing
from conflicts and ex ante waivers).
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plaintiffs' lawyers to steer clear of them, 42 then the argument for per-
mitting ex ante waiver largely disappears. In any particular set ofcases, one does not know in advance whether the parties will strike adeal on an all-or-nothing basis. Thus, the strength of the ex antewaiver argument depends in part on the overall expected frequency of
all-or-nothing aggregate settlements.
V. APPLICATION OF THE TYPOLOGY TO CLASS SETTLEMENTS
While the typology lends itself to defining the reach of the aggre-gate settlement rule in the non-class context, it may help describeclass action settlements as well. For class actions, the typology is notneeded for defining which settlements are aggregate. Every class set-tlement is by definition aggregate, but it is far from clear that the ag-gregate settlement rule itself applies to class actions. The typology
adds little to deciding whether the constraints of Rule 1.8(g) apply inthe class action context. The typology is useful, however, for under-standing the various shapes that class settlements take and for seeing
the potential conflicts of interest in those settlements.
A. Class Actions and the Aggregate Settlement Rule
Class actions ordinarily end in settlement. As Richard Nagaredaputs it, "class actions today serve as the procedural vehicle not ulti-mately for adversarial litigation but for dealmaking on a mass ba-
sis. " 143 Because a class settlement necessarily involves numerous classmembers,1 44 and because class litigation and settlement by definitionproceed on a representative rather than individual basis, the settle-ment of a class action represents the quintessential aggregate
settlement.
The unsurprising assertion that class settlements are aggregate
settlements, however, does not answer whether they are or should begoverned by the disclosure and informed consent requirements of theaggregate settlement rule. Model Rule 1.8(g) and most of the stateversions of the aggregate settlement rule do not expressly excludeclass actions, 145 and occasionally the rule has been applied to class
142 See Rheingold, supra note 67, at 478 ("Knowledgeable counsels will not paintthemselves into a comer whereby all of their clients must agree to the plan.").
143 Nagareda, supra note 97, at 151.144 See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a) (1) (requiring numerosity for class certification).145 See MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-106(A) (1980); MODEL RuLEs
OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1. 8 (g) (2002); Laws. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA)
51:382 (June 24, 1998) ("The ABA's ethics rules on aggregate settlements and the
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action settlements.1 46 The aggregate settlement rule, however, is bet-
ter suited to addressing settlements involving multiple named parties
rather than representative litigation. In a class action, settlement pro-
tections are better accorded through the mechanisms of the class ac-
tion rule, including the constraints on class certification, 147 the
requirement of court approval of settlement,1 48 and in most money
damages class actions, the right to opt out.
149
Some state variations sensibly exclude class actions from the oper-
ation of the rule. North Dakota's Rule 1.8(g) specifies that the rule
applies "other than in class actions."15 0 Similarly, the notes to Califor-
nia's aggregate settlement rule state that the rule "is not intended to
apply to class action settlements subject to court approval."1 5 1 The
revised 2003 comment to the Model Rule, as well, implies that class
actions are not subject to the rule:
Lawyers representing a class of plaintiffs or defendants, or those
proceeding derivatively, may not have a full client-lawyer relation-
ship with each member of the class; nevertheless, such lawyers must
comply with applicable rules regulating notification of class mem-
rules of most states contain no express exclusion that makes the rules inapplicable to
complex, multiparty actions such as class actions.").
146 See In re Green, 354 S.E.2d 557, 558 (S.C. 1987) (finding that an attorney vio-
lated DR 5-106 by settling a case designated as a class action without giving notice to
all class members); Ala. Ethics Comm. Op. 89-68 (1989) (finding that a lawyer ap-
pointed to represent a class of unknown heirs should use reasonable means to give
the class adequate notice of any aggregate settlement, citing, inter alia, DR 5-106(A));
see also Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ethics and the Settlements of Mass Torts: When the Rules
Meet the Road, 80 CORNELL L. REv. 1159, 1189-95 (1995) (discussing the difficulty of
applying conflict of interest rules, particularly the requirement of consent, to class
actions).
147 See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)-(b).
148 See FED. R. Crv. P. 23(e). Rule 23 has long required court approval of settle-
ment, but until recently, the rule itself gave no procedural or substantive content to
how that requirement should be followed. The 2003 amendments to Rule 23(e) ad-
ded a requirement that the court hold a fairness hearing to evaluate any class settle-
ment. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e) (1) (C). The revised rule also requires a finding that the
settlement is "fair, reasonable, and adequate." Id.
149 See FED. R. CIv. P. 23(c)(2)(B).
150 N.D. R. PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.8(g) (2003).
A lawyer who represents two or more clients, other than in class actions, shall
not participate in making an aggregate settlement of the claims of or against
the clients, or in a criminal case an aggregated agreement as to guilty pleas,
unless, after consultation, including disclosure of the existence and nature
of all the claims or pleas involved and of the participation of each person in
the settlement, each client consents.
Id.
151 CAL. R. PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3-310(D) drafter's notes (1992).
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bers and other procedural requirements designed to ensure ade-
quate protection of the entire class. 152
In a recent article on conflicts of interest in class actions, Geof-
frey Miller shows the difficulty of applying standard conflict of interest
rules, including the aggregate settlement rule, to class actions. I5 3 He
proposes a "hypothetical consent standard" for conflicts of interest, by
which a court evaluates whether "a reasonable plaintiff under a veil of
ignorance as to his or her position in the class would refuse consent to
the arrangement.' ' 54 The aggregate settlement rule and other con-
flict rules cannot simply be applied to class actions because consent
operates differently in class actions. "The difficulty, from the stand-
point of class action law, is that the safety valve of client consent is
missing, either to authorize the representation of multiple plaintiffs
or tojustify the settlement. The problem is general: class action litiga-
tion is incompatible with client consent."1 55 In mandatory class ac-
tions, such as those under Federal Rule 23(b) (1) or (b) (2), consent is
entirely absent. Even in Rule 23(b) (3) class actions, consent takes the
passive form of a right to opt out, which in practice differs dramati-
cally from opt-in or individual informed consent.1 5 6 Finally, the no-
tice and consent process for class settlements differs from the dictates
of the aggregate settlement rule.' 57
The relationship between class counsel and absent class members
differs from the standard lawyer-client relationship. Because of the
nature of the lawyer-client relationship in class actions, settlement no-
152 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.8(g) cmt. 13 (2003).
153 See Miller, supra note 106, at 586-87.
154 Id. at 590.
155 Id. at 586.
156 See id; see also Erichson, supra note 1, at 553-75 (exploring the connections
between opt-out, opt-in, and informed consent).
157 See Miller, supra note 106, at 586-87. Miller distinguishes class settlements in
terms of both notice and consent:
Similarly, once the class action has been provisionally settled, the notice ofsettlement (which in a settlement class may coincide with the class action
notice), will rarely contain the disclosures required by the aggregate settle-
ment rule. And even if the notice did contain the necessary disclosures, the
class member's option is, again, only to reject or accept the settlement,
which is not tantamount to an affirmative manifestation of consent to the
settlement's terms.
Id. I disagree with the assumption that the aggregate settlement rule nearly alwaysrequires more than class settlement notice. The disclosure required for aggregate
settlements, especially in mass collective representation, need not be dramatically dif-ferent in content from class settlement notice. See Erichson, supra note 1, at 574-75.Nonetheless, Professor Miller is correct that the difference between opt-out and in-
formed consent distinguishes class actions from the aggregate settlement rule.
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tice and consent in class actions should be governed by the law of class
actions rather than by the aggregate settlement rule, even if the state's
version of the aggregate settlement rule does not expressly exclude
class actions.
B. Class Settlement Allocation
The typology of aggregate settlements, even if it does not help
define the scope of the aggregate settlement rule for class actions,
may offer a helpful way to understand class settlements themselves.
Class settlements, like non-class aggregate settlements, allocate settle-
ment amounts to individual claimants in various ways. The typology,
as shown on Table 3, can be used to describe class settlements in
terms of allocation method. Although problematic, some class settle-
ment allocations can best be described as lump sum. 158 The Agent
Orange class action settled for a lump sum of $180 million, paid into a
fund administered by the court.159 Other class settlements provide a
fixed per capita amount for each class member. A class action over
tainted blood products, for example, provided a $100,000 payment to
each class member who contracted HIV.16°  Consumer antitrust class
actions against Microsoft in a number of states settled on a basis that
provided vouchers of fixed amounts for each of certain Microsoft
products that class members had purchased. 161 Many class settle-
ments establish a matrix, 162 formula, 163 or claims mechanism 164 for
allocating settlement payouts to class members.
158 See Matthew L. Garretson, A Fine Line We Walk, in 2 ATLA ANNUAL CONVENTION
REFERENCE MATERIALS 1891, 1908 (2003) (describing a lawsuit brought by asbestos
class members against their former lawyers, alleging that the lawyers entered into ag-
gregate settlements of the claims and that "the attorneys exercised complete and un-
supervised discretion with regard to settlement funds, including the amount and
timing of the disbursement of the funds to their clients"); see also In re Combustion,
Inc., 978 F. Supp. 673 (W.D. La. 1997) (adopting a special master's report on criteria
for allocating and distributing a class settlement after preliminary approval had been
granted based on a lump sum amount of over twenty million dollars to settle the
claims of over 10,000 class members).
159 In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740, 858, 863 (E.D.N.Y.
1984), affd, 818 F.2d 145 (2d Cir. 1987).
160 See Walker v. Bayer Corp., No. 96-C5024, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10060, at *4
(N.D. Ill. June 23, 1999) (mem.) (referring to a $100,000 per-plaintiff settlement for
class members with HIV in litigation over contaminated blood products).
161 See Microsoft to Settle Suit with Vouchers, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 25, 2003, at C6 (describ-
ing voucher settlement in the Tennessee class action); Microsoft California Class Action
Settlement, available at http://www.microsoftcalsettlement.com (last visited Mar. 29,
2005) (detailing the voucher settlement in the California class action).
162 Jay Tidmarsh describes the matrix used in the 1994 Lindsey v. Dow Corning Corp.
settlement class action in the breast implant litigation:
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Just as non-class aggregate settlements do not always fit neatlyinto a particular box in the typology, neither do class settlements.
Many settlements are best understood as hybrids. In the breast im-
plant litigation, a 1995 settlement class action provided for a per cap-
ita payment of $5000 to each class member, plus a matrix allocation of
additional payments for certain categories of claims, plus a more com-plex matrix or formula for higher amounts based on particular medi-
cal criteria.165 In a class action involving claims of defective heart
valves, the settlement established a consultation fund with a per capitapayment of $4000, potentially adjusted downward based on the num-
ber of claimants, plus compensation for injuries based on an alterna-
tive of either a matrix payout or an arbitration mechanism. 166 The
Manual for Complex Litigation (Fourth) describes a claims valuation pro-
cess that can be understood as a settlement matrix administered
through a claims mechanism:
Where the value of the personal injury claims varies, courts haveapproved settlements that establish fixed amounts for injuries thatmeet defined criteria and create claims facilities to administer the
The first step was to fit the claimant onto a compensation grid. The grid had
two axes: a disease axis and an age axis. The disease axis contained the four
disease processes for which compensation was allowed, as well as subcatego-
ries based on severity. The age axis broke age into 35 and under, 36-40,
41-45, 46-50, 51-55, and over 5&. Once a person's disease and age were
known, the grid provided the exact dollar amount of compensation. For
instance, an under-35 woman with lupus in the highest severity category re-
ceived the highest possible award: $2 million. The same-aged woman withthe least severe form of lupus received $200,000. A 60-year-old woman with
severe lupus received $1.5 million. A 60-year-old woman with mild lupus
received the lowest award in the grid: $150,000. Decisions about classifica-
tion of a claim were subject to appeal to the claims administrator, and ulti-
mately to the district court.
JAY TIDMARSH, MASs TORT SETTLEMENT CLAss ACTIONS: FIVE CASE STUDIEs 80 (1998).
163 Securities and antitrust class actions epitomize situations in which settlementamounts can be allocated by formula, based on the amount and timing of each class
member's purchases and sales.
164 See, e.g., Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997) (rejecting, for
other reasons, an asbestos settlement class action that established a complex claimsmechanism for resolving asbestos claims against a group of defendants); see alsoMartha Minow, Judge for the Situation:Judge Jack Weinstein, Creator of Temporary Adminis-
trative Agencies, 97 COLUM. L. REv. 2010, 2019-21 (1997) (discussingJudge Weinstein's
role in creating administrative compensation schemes in class settlements).
165 See TIDMARSH, supra note 162, at 81-82 (describing the terms of the revised1995 settlement by Bristol-Myers, Baxter, 3M, McGhan, and Union Carbide).
166 See Bowling v. Pfizer, Inc., 143 F.R.D. 141 (S.D. Ohio 1992) (certifying the classand approving the settlement); TIDMARSH, supra note 162, at 36-39 (describing the
settlement terms).
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claims process. The parties may establish an administrative appeal
process, an auditing process, or both, to review the claims of those
dissatisfied with the application of the criteria.167
The settlement class action addressed in Amchem, although re-
jected by the Supreme Court based on adequacy and predominance
problems, among other things, represents a class settlement with a
matrix for allocating amounts and a claims mechanism for making the
determinations required by the matrix. 168
Finally, a limited fund class action settlement, 169 to the extent it
remains viable after Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp.,170 can be understood as a
form of lump sum settlement or a settlement with a total cap. Given
the command of Ortiz that essentially all of the assets of the defendant
be used to satisfy the plaintiffs' claims in any limited fund class ac-
tion, 17 1 any limited fund class settlement incorporates the sort of zero-
sum interdependence represented by the "Lump Sum" and "Total
Cap" rows of the typology.
C. Class Settlement Conditionality
The typology described in this Article and shown on Table 3 also
helps describe collective conditions in settlement class actions and in
class action settlements with settlement opt-outs. Class settlements
range from those in which every class member is bound by the settle-
ment, to those in which each class member is free to decline the settle-
ment individually without affecting others, to those in which class
members' individual decisions to decline the settlement may destroy
the settlement for others.
Some class settlements-particularly settlement class actions
under Federal Rule 23(b) (3) or its state equivalents-permit individ-
ual class members to opt out of the deal. In terms of the typology,
such settlement opt-out rights make a class settlement resemble a non-
class aggregate settlement with independent conditionality, i.e., with
no collective conditions. In addition to settlement class actions under
Rule 23(b) (3), which necessarily include the right to opt out,17 2 some
167 MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 22.922 (2004) (citing In re Diet
Drugs Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 1203, 2000 WL 1222042, at *23-24, *63 (E.D. Pa.
Aug. 28, 2000)).
168 See Amchem, 521 U.S. at 603-05.
169 See FED. R. CIv. P. 23(b) (1) (B).
170 527 U.S. 815 (1999).
171 See id. at 849.
172 See FED. R. CIv. P. 23(c) (2) (B).
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litigation class actions may settle on a basis that permits class members
to opt out after learning the settlement terms. 173
Like non-class aggregate settlements with walk-away provisions,
class settlements sometimes include provisions that render the settle-
ment void or voidable if greater than a set number or percent opt
out.1 74 The Manual for Complex Litigation (Fourth) describes such settle-
ment terms:
Defendants often condition a settlement in a Rule 23(b) (3) class on
having the number of opt-outs remain at or below a certain percent-
age or number of absent class members, commonly known as a
"blow-out" clause. This is particularly significant in cases with a
large number of claims that might support individual litigation. 175
In a California class action over stock option payments, for exam-
ple, a proposed settlement failed because too many employees opted
out.1 76 Similarly, the Sulzer hip implant settlement gave the defen-
dant a right to withdraw from the class settlement if there were too
many opt-outs,' 77 and a settlement class action in litigation over defec-
tive heart valves gave the defendant the right to walk away from the
173 See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(3) (permitting courts to condition approval of settle-
ments on giving class members another opportunity to opt out of the class action
suit).
174 Richard Nagareda points out the interdependence introduced by such provi-
sions: "A right-to-withdraw clause undoubtedly introduces a degree of interdepen-
dence to class members' claims. All will lose the benefit of the class settlement if too
many choose to opt out." Nagareda, supra note 97, at 217. He distinguishes such
provisions, however, from techniques that deter opt-outs by modifying preexisting le-
gal rights. See id. at 217-18.
175 MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 22.922 (2004) (citing In re Sili-
cone Gel Breast Implant Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 926, (N.D. Ala. Dec. 22, 1995)
(Order No. 27, approving revised settlement program and injunctions), available at
http://www.fjc.gov/BREIMLIT/ORDERS/orders.htm; see also 4 ALBA CONTE & HER-
BERT B. NEWBERG, NEWBERG ON CLAss ACTIONS § 12:12 (4th ed. 2002) (outlining right-
to-withdraw clauses); George Rutherglen, Better Late than Never: Notice and Opt Out at
the Settlement Stage of Class Actions, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 258, 281-82 (1996) ("[O]ffers of
settlement could be made contingent upon acceptance of the offer by a sufficient
number of class members.").
176 See Burrows v. Qualcomm, Inc., No. D040808, 2004 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS
2819, at *5 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 29, 2004) (discussing the class action settlement in
Sprague v. Qualcomm, Inc., No. 730565 (San Diego County Super. Ct. 1999), which"was not consummated because a large number of employees opted out of it"); see also
Mike Drummond, Qualcomm Settlement Could Be Torpedoed, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB.,
Mar. 22, 2000, at C1 ("Just days after Qualcomm reached a class action settlement
with more than 1,000 former employees, disgruntled litigants are threatening to scut-
tle the deal. Qualcomm has the right to walk away from the $8.9 million settlement if
a 'certain number' refuse to accept terms of the agreement.").
177 See Nagareda, supra note 97, at 217 & n.291.
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settlement if there were over a certain number of front-end opt-outs
from the settlement.1 78
Some class settlements include a variation on the walk-away
clause: if greater than a certain number or percent opt out in a given
year, then class members are placed on a queue to opt out the follow-
ing year or later. Such a provision was included in the massive asbes-
tos settlement class action that ultimately was rejected by the Supreme
Court in Amchem. 179 Each plaintiff class member was entitled to ac-
cept or reject the Rule 23(b) (3) opt-out settlement class action, but
the number of opt-outs was limited to a certain percent per year,
tiered by disease category. Only two percent of the mesothelioma
plaintiffs, two percent of the lung cancer plaintiffs, one percent of
other cancer plaintiffs, and one-half percent of plaintiffs with non-
malignant conditions could opt out in a given year. If too many class
members in a category chose to opt out, they would be put in a queue
to opt out at a later date.1 s0 Such opt-out limits function as a Rule
23(b) (3) variant on walk-away provisions. Rather than voiding a set-
tlement, they restrict the flow of individual lawsuits by controlling the
timing of opt-outs.
Both walk-away and restricted-flow provisions address the prob-
lem of excessive opt-outs. Some class settlements, however, address
what may seem like the opposite problem: too many claimants under
the class settlement. These settlements include a provision that might
be called downward ratchet conditionality. In these deals, individual class
members' settlement amounts are reduced if greater than a set num-
ber of class members file claims for compensation under the settle-
178 Bowling v. Pfizer, Inc., 143 F.R.D. 141 (S.D. Ohio 1992); TIDMARsH, supra note
162, at 37 ("Pfizer also reserved the right to withdraw from the settlement in the event
that an excessive number of claimants excluded themselves from the class during the
initial 'front-end' opt-out period."); see also id. at 95 (describing the Walker v. Bayer
Corp. settlement class action involving HIV-tainted blood products, in which "[e]ach
defendant also reserved the right to withdraw in the event that too many class mem-
bers opted out").
The settlement agreement in the Agent Orange class action provided: "Any de-
fendant shall have the right to withdraw from this Agreement if it believes in its discre-
tion that the number of persons who have elected to be excluded from the Class is
substantial." In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740, 865 (E.D.N.Y.
1984), affd, 818 F.2d 145 (2d Cir. 1987). The agreement specified that if any defen-
dant withdrew, the settlement would remain in force for the remaining defendants in
accordance with their proportionate share of the settlement amount. Id.
179 See, e.g., Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 605 (1997) ("A small of
number class members-only a few per year-may reject the settlement .... Those
permitted to exercise this option, however, may not assert any punitive damages or
any claim for increased risk of cancer.").
180 See TIDMARSH, supra note 162, at 53.
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ment. The breast implant settlement class action, both in its original
form in 1994 and as revised in 1995, included such a downward
ratchet.181
Other class action settlements provide no opportunity for plain-
tiffs to exclude themselves from the deal. These mandatory aggregate
settlements do not fit neatly along the conditionality axis of the typol-
ogy, which implicitly assumes that clients decide whether to accept or
reject a settlement. From one perspective, a mandatory class settle-
ment can be ufiderstood as a type of all-or-nothing deal. If the court
approves the settlement, then the deal applies to every class member;
if the court does not approve the settlement, then it applies to none.
This description of all-or-nothing settlements reveals that class settle-
ments may be mandatory even if the underlying class action was not.
Mandatory aggregate settlements, as I use the term here, include not only
Rule 23(b)(1) and 23(b)(2) class settlements, but also many Rule
23(b)(3) settlements and perhaps bankruptcy reorganization pack-
ages as well. Class action settlements under Rules 23(b) (1) (A),
23(b) (1) (B), and 23(b) (2) are the most obvious mandatory aggregate
settlements because such actions, collectively known as "mandatory
class actions," ordinarily do not include a right to opt out. 8 2 But
mandatory aggregate settlements occur frequently under Rule
23(b) (3) as well. Whenever a Rule 23(b) (3) class action results in a
settlement that is not a settlement class action, and without a settle-
ment opt-out,1 8 3 the settlement functions as an all-or-nothing deal in
the sense described above. If the court approves the settlement, every
class member is bound by it. Those who opted out at the outset of the
class action would no longer be considered part of the class, but
among those remaining as class members after the conclusion of the
181 Jay Tidmarsh describes the downward ratchet provision in the 1994 settlement:
Since the defendants provided only so much money, it was possible that
there would not be enough money to pay everyone's claims at the scheduled
rate. In that event, the agreement required that the payments to eligible
claimants be "ratcheted down" by reducing compensation levels according
to a predetermined formula. As a general matter, the less severe diseases
were ratcheted down first and most severely. Significantly, ongoing claim-
ants were entitled to compensation only at the "ratcheted down" rate actu-
ally paid to current claimants, not at the scheduled rate.
Id. at 80; see also id. at 82 (describing the 1995 downward ratchet provision). Both
versions of the settlement provided class members a second opt-out right in the event
of a ratcheting down of settlement amounts, although these opt-out rights came with
certain restrictions. See id. at 80-82.
182 See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c) (2) (B) (limiting the opt-out requirement to class ac-
tions under Rule 23(b) (3)).
183 See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(3).
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opt-out period, an approved settlement binds everyone unless the set-
tlement provides an additional opportunity to exit. One interesting
implication of this is that it highlights the importance of the new pro-
vision in Rule 23 that permits courts to impose settlement opt-outs. 1 84
Describing Rule 23(b) (3) class settlements as a form of mandatory
aggregate settlement, especially in light of the policies underlying the
aggregate settlement rule, underlines the importance of such settle-
ment opt-outs to protect client interests.
Mandatory aggregate settlements, despite their apparent similar-
ity to all-or-nothing deals, fit poorly on the conditionality axis of the
typology as shown on Table 3. From one perspective, they belong in
the "All-or-nothing" column, but from another, they belong in the "In-
dependent" column. Because of this poor fit, class actions give reason
to rethink the typology's notion of conditionality. Is conditionality
about claims or releases? The answer depends on the purpose of the
question. For purposes of describing settlements that defendants
crave-settlements that resolve all claims-mandatory settlements are
all-or-nothing. The defendant's payment eliminates all of the claims.
In this regard, the defendant obtains the same core benefit whether
the mechanism for preventing further claims is res judicata (by class
action), release (by aggregate settlement agreements), or discharge
(by bankruptcy). But for purposes of understanding the lawyer-client
conflict of interest created by collective conditions-specifically, the
risk that lawyers will pressure clients to accept a settlement to prevent
the overall deal from falling apart-mandatory settlements should be
understood as independent. In a mandatory aggregate settlement,
unless the deal contains a walk-away provision, no plaintiff's compen-
sation is jeopardized by other plaintiffs' refusal to accept the deal.
The relevance of the lawyer-client conflict, as discussed above in
the context of non-class aggregate settlements, 185 is to determine what
disclosure should be made to clients to enable them to make reasona-
bly informed decisions on whether to accept the settlement and
thereby release their claims. That inquiry matters in non-class aggre-
gate settlements as well as in opt-out class settlements because each
plaintiff has an opportunity to decide whether to accept or reject the
settlement. However, in mandatory aggregate settlements, each plain-
tiff is not given a choice whether to release claims in exchange for
184 Rule 23(e) (3), adopted in 2003, provides: "In an action previously certified as
a class action under Rule 23(b) (3), the court may refuse to approve a settlement
unless it affords a new opportunity to request exclusion to individual class members
who had an earlier opportunity to request exclusion but did not do so." Id.
185 See supra text accompanying notes 111-15 supra.
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compensation under the settlement. Thus, while the disclosure and
informed consent requirements of the aggregate settlement rule ap-
ply to non-class aggregate settlements, and similar concerns bear on
settlement class actions and class actions with settlement opt-outs, they
do not apply the same way to the mandatory aggregate settlements
that may occur in bankruptcy, in limited fund class settlements, or in
post-certification Rule 23 (b) (3) class action settlements without settle-
ment opt-outs.
CONCLUSION
When plaintiffs' lawyers and defense lawyers are faced with large
numbers of related claims, they handle them on an aggregate basis,
regardless of class certification. Often, they settle them on an aggre-
gate basis as well. But saying that mass litigation settles in blocks may
obscure as much as it reveals. Understanding group settlements in
terms of their key attributes-allocation and conditionality-gets to
the heart of the distinction between individual and collective settle-
ments. A typology drawn from these attributes permits a more ra-
tional application of ethical protections, as well as a clearer picture of
the variety of settlement structures currently in use.
I do not expect that the typology is complete. Undoubtedly,
there are types of aggregate settlements that have been used but of
which I am unaware, and surely there are many others yet to be de-
vised. What seems likely, however, is that the essential collective at-
tributes of those settlements can be described in terms of allocation
and conditionality. If a settlement agreement involves neither collec-
tive allocation nor collective conditions, then the strong presumption
should be that it is not an aggregate settlement. If, on the contrary,
the settlement terms contain either some form of collective allocation
or collective conditions, then the settlement gives rise to the types of
conflicts of interest that implicate the aggregate settlement rule. The
typology can grow and change by the addition of ijew forms of collec-
tive allocation between the two poles of lump sum and individual
amounts, and by the addition of new collective conditions between
the two poles of all-or-nothing and independent settlements. But
even in its present form, the typology should suffice to demonstrate
that a wide range of settlement types implicates the concerns of collec-
tive representation, and perhaps it will prevent the mischief that
comes from the misconception that "aggregate settlement" means
nothing more than a lump sum package deal.
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